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PANEL ONE: FEDERAL PREEMPTION
OF STATE LAW CLAIMS

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: THE
POLITICS OF PREEMPTION
Linda S. Mullenixt

INTRODUCTION

Underscoring the judicial resurgence of interest in the doctrine of
federal preemption, the United States Supreme Court opened its
2008-2009 Term on October 6, 2008 with oral argument in Altria
Group, Inc. v. Good,' followed swiftly in November by argument in
2
Wyeth v. Levine. Both these preemption appeals follow in the wake3
of the Court's spring 2008 decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,
upholding express preemption of state law claims under the Medical
Devices Amendments Act of 1976.
Since the Court's 1992 decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc. , federal preemption has been a doctrine of especial scholarly
tMomrs & Rita Atlas Chair in Advocacy, The University of Texas School of Law.
Thanks to Melissa Bernstein of the Tarlton Law Library of the University of Texas School of
Law for research assistance in preparing this Article.
1 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
2 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009); see Associated Press, Supreme Court Rejects Limits on Drug
Lawsuits, MSNBC.COM, mar. 4, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.conid/29509869/.
3128 S. Ct. 999, 1010 (2008).
4505 U.S. 504 (1992). See generally Robert J. Katerberg, Patching the "Crazy Quilt" of
Cipollone: A Divided Court Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1440 (1997) (discussing Riegel, Cippollone, and federal
preemption of products liability).
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focus, bearing as it does on constitutional questions concerning the
allocation of power between the federal and state governments and
among the states themselves.5 Consequently, an entire cottage
industry of constitutional law and federal courts scholars have
produced a sizeable library relating to preemption doctrine, and in
recent years the academic literature has experienced a veritable
tsunami of scholarship on federal preemption. 6 Much of this
scholarship focuses on purported justifications for the two types of
preemption-express and implied preemption-and further close
parsing of the rationales for conflict and field preemption.7
Several commonly-held generalizations about the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts are implicated in the discussion of preemption
doctrine. One sweeping generalization is that the conservative
shift in the Court's personnel has resulted in limiting access to
justice,8 a theme that implicitly underlies this symposium. Another
5See, e.g., Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS LiJ. 431,
508 (2002); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1, 130
(2004).
6 See, e.g., FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A.
Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007); THOMAS 0. MCGARrrY, THE PREEMPTION WAR:
WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES (2008); William W. Buzbee,
Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1547 (2007); David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of FederalPreemption, 102 Nw. U.
L. REV. 507 (2008); Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and
the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089 (2007); Lisa Kinney Helvin, Administrative Preemption in
Areas of TraditionalState Authority, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 617 (2008); Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
Against Preemption:How FederalismCan Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (2007); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53
UCLA. L. REv. 1353 (2006); David A. Kessler & David C. vladeck, A CriticalExamination of
the FDA 's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461 (2008); Nina A.
Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 695 (2008);
Thomas WV.
Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 727 (2008); Mark
D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 781 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State versus
Federal Court, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1013 (2007) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalism in Action];
Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 449 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption,
102 Nw. U. L. REV. 841 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA
Preemption of State Law Products Liability Claims, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 415 (2008)
[hereinafter Sharkey, What Riegel Portends]; Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble:
Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble]; David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory
Failure,33 PEPP. L. REV. 95 (2005); Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639 (2008); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. 869 (2008); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Preemptiont: States' Powers, National Interests,
TRIAL, Feb. 2008, at 58 (reviewing the book of the same title); Brian Wolfmnan, Why
Preemption Proponents Are Wrong, TRIAL, Mar. 2007, at 20, 2 1.
7See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug
Cases, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54 (2008) (repudiating the Kessler-Viadeck approach
rejecting implied preemption and in support of tort system; criticizing the Sharkey approach of
adm-inistrative deference; arguing in favor of field preemption).
8 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (rejecting regime of
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generalization posits that the Court during the past two decades
has consistently favored states-rights claims, illustrated for example
by the Court's robust enforcement of Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity defenses. 9 Preemption doctrine, however, is in tension with
these trends, because preemption cuts off a claimant's ability to
pursue state-based claims. Thus, federal courts' application of
preemption doctrine both restricts access to justice while undermining
state sovereignty.
The purpose of this Article is not to analyze the 2008-2009
Court's decisions in the Altria and Wyeth cases, nor to examine
preemption jurisprudence embodied in the Court's decision last Term
in Riegel. Rather, the focus of this Article is on the politics of
preemption, exploring the political and policy bases undergirding the
doctrine. 10 This Article attempts to illustrate how preemption doctrine
is at war with itself and consequently has engendered strange political
bedfellows, arrayed along interesting political fault lines."1 Moreover,
the Article suggests that the preemption landscape is now more
complex and uncertain, given the Court's opinions in Rie gel, Altria,

Conley notice pleading and requiring heightened pleading standard of "plausibility" in antitrust
class action lawsuits).
9See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). But cf. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S.
613, 616 (2002) (stating that no Eleventh Amendment immunity attaches to cases removed by
states to federal court). See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment
and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47 (1998) (discussing the debate over the use of sovereign
immunity though the Eleventh Amendment); John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and
the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004) (discussing the
controversy surrounding the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign
Immunity as a Doctrine of PersonalJurisdiction, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1559 (2002) (arguing that
the Eleventh Amendment created a new form of sovereign immunity); James E. Pfander,
History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998) (discussing the historical origins of the Eleventh Amendment);
Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism:Thze Proper Textual Basis of the
Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 819 (1999)
(discussing Supreme Court decisions regarding the Eleventh Amendment immunity question).
10See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TlIMEs, Mar. 16, 2008, (Magazine), at 38
(commenting on the transformation in the Roberts' Court's receptivity to business litigation and
business interests; discussing the political and ideological forces behind the Court's shifted
focus).
11Other commentators have noted the philosophical inconsistencies inspired by
preemption doctrine. See, e.g., Erwin Chemeninsky, A Troubling Trend in Preemption Rulings,
TRtAL, May 2008, at 62, 64 ("Preemption cases create the opportunity for an unusual coalition
of the more liberal justices, like Justice Stephen Breyer, who favor more expansive national
power, and the conservative justices, like Scalia and Chief Justice John Roberts, who are
strongly pro-business. That is exactly what happened in Riegel, and that is what will probably
happen in future cases."); Rosen, supra note 10, at 66-7 1.
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and Wyeth, complemented by the shift in national political control
evidenced by the November 2008 elections.
Preemption doctrine has engendered at least three sets of strange
bedfellows. First, preemption doctrine has united the pro-business,
states' rights, and libertarian wings of the conservative movement.
Second-and more unusual-preemption doctrine has allied some
conservative business interests with some liberal advocates of
consumer protection. And, third, preemption doctrine has fractured
the plaintiffs' bar, inspiring a division between advocates of
aggregate versus individual litigation. How these doctrinal schisms
and shifting ideological alliances have developed is an interesting
story.
The first part of this Article explores the business community's
strategies to advance the fortunes of a robust preemption doctrine
through legislative and administrative lobbying, as well as judicial
activism. This portion of the Article traces current preemption
advocacy back to the Republican movement for civil justice reform in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, ultimately expressed in the long-term
civil justice reformn platform articulated in the Republican Contract
for America.
The latter portion of this Article then discusses the schism among
various groups relating to support for preemption doctrine, focusing
on the three sets of strange bedfellows. First, this section traces
conservative advocacy of preemption doctrine through various
institutional auspices, including advocacy in the Court's recent
consideration of the Riegel, Altria, and Wyeth appeals. Preemption
doctrine, it will be seen, has managed to unite disparate wings of
conservative thinking. Nonetheless, conservative thinking has
consistently supported a pro-preemption stance.
Second, preemption doctrine has made strange bedfellows of both
conservative and liberal jurists in some cases. As the Court's 8-1
decision in Rie gel demonstrates, the Court's cluster of liberal Justices
are perfectly willing to unite with the Court's conservative wing to
uphold express preemption of state law claims. The philosophical
glue uniting these Justices bears some examination, because this glue
can become undone in other preemption litigation, especially implied
preemption cases, such as Wyeth 12 and Altria. In addition, given the
12 See, e.g., wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009) (upholding state jury award
and rejecting federal doctrine of implied federal preemption; 6-3 decision with Justices Alito,
Roberts, and Scalia dissenting; Justice Thomas joining in the majority result but not writing
separate opinion); see also Robert Barnes, Court Defies Pro-Business Label, Decisions Reveal
More Nuanced Portrait, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2009, at A2 ("And after last week's decision
flatly turning down the position of pharmaceutical companies that they were insulated from state
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possible political shifts embodied in the November 2008 election
results, the future fate of preemption doctrine as an access-control
mechanism is now more unclear and muddled than in the past.
Finally, preemption has made strange bedfellows among the
plaintiffs' bar, pitting the interests of aggregate litigation advocates
against those of the traditional plaintiffs' bar. In the concluding
sections, this Article explores the development of the plaintiffs' class
action bar's strategy to advance its interests through judicial,
legislative, and lobbying efforts, including advocacy of preemption
doctrine. When the plaintiffs' class action bar was forced to abandon
aggregate litigation in state forums as a consequence of the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA),'13 aggregate litigation
proponents became ardent champions of the federalization of class
action litigation and, consequently, supporters of a robust theory of
preemption. Consequently and ironically, these former champions of
state law tort forums reversed course and endorsed federalization of
tort law. Thus, in an unusual turn of events, the class action plaintiffs'
bar aligned its interests with some of the most conservative business
interests in the United States.
The class action bar's support of federal preemption, however,
stands in conflict with the position of the traditional plaintiffs' bar.
Historically, virtually all public interest law groups have advocated
against application of preemption doctrine because it denies access to
the courts and cuts off the rights of injured tort claimants to a forum
for compensatory relief of their claims. As partial evidence of this
position, congressional liberals swiftly introduced legislation to undo
14
the preemption consequences of the Court's Riegel decision.

lawsuits filed by injured patients, something of a reevaluation of the court is underway.").
11 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 3, 119 Stat. 4, 5-9 (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, and 1711-1715 (2006)). See generally John Beisner & Jessica
Davidson Miller, The Class Action FairnessAct: Cleaning Up the Class Action Mess, 6 CLASS
ACTION LrrIG. REP. 104 (2005); Stephanie Fiereck, Class Action Reform: Be Prepared to
Address New Notification Requirements, 6 CLASS ACTION LIMI. REP. 333, 333 (2005) (noting
that CAFA was "promoted as a husiness-backed initiative"); Jennifer Gibson, New Rules for
Class Action Settlements: The Consumner Class Action Bill of Rights, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1103
(2006); Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived
Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695 (2006); Richard A. Nagareda,
Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and
CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872 (2006); Scott Nelson & Brian wolfman, A Section-by-Section
Analysis of the Class Action "Fairness" Act, 6 CLASS ACTION LiTiG. REP. 365, 372 (2005)
("The Class Action Fairness Act marks the first major success of the Bush administration's
efforts to enact pro-defendant civil justice legislation."); Lewis F. Powell 111,Class Settlement of
Mass Tort Cases, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 259 (2006) (commentary on CAFA settlement
provisions).
14 See S. 3398, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2d Sess. 2008) (amending Section 521 of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360k at subsection (c) to read: "Nothing in this
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As the concluding discussion suggests, while conservative
attitudes towards preemption seem at least doctrinally and politically
consistent, the liberal approaches to preemption do not. Moreover,
support for a robust preemption doctrine has resulted in ideological
costs to both conservatives and liberals. For conservatives, robust
enforcement of preemption doctrine is in derogation of states' rights,
local police powers, and the ability of state courts to adjudicate the
claims of their own citizens, Robust enforcement of preemption also
frustrates the ability of state courts to serve as laboratories for
experimentation and change.
For liberals, robust enforcement of preemption doctrine has the
consequence of depriving claimants' access to justice in state court
forums. While conservatives may comfortably embrace the
diminution of states' rights implicit in preemption doctrine precisely
because it does limit access to justice, liberals ought to be
uncomfortable with the consequent restrictions on the ability of
injured people to obtain compensatory state law tort relief against a
background of weak federal or insufficient administrative regulatory
oversight.
Moreover, it is disquieting that some purported liberals have
embraced and advocated a preemption doctrine that seems so clearly
not in the interests of injured parties or small claims consumers.
Fundamentally, something seems entirely amiss when purported
liberals urge a preemption doctrine that cuts off access to justice for
individuals. Even more troubling, in the quest to federalize class
action settlements and to achieve global settlements at any price, the
class action plaintiffs' bar has aligned itself with its traditional
adversaries, in an unseemly preemption dance.
Thus, the debate over preemption has exposed interesting political
alliances and fault lines among advocates for justice. How these
political alignments and schisms will play out in ensuing years

section shall be construed to modify or otherwise affect any action for damages or the liability
of any person under the law of any State."); see alsoH.R. 638 1, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008)
(related legislation); Press Release, Kennedy, Colleagues Introduce Bill to Reverse Supreme
Court Decision, Protect Consumers from Dangerous Medical Devices (July 31, 2008),
http://kennedy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-.releases.cfm (select "July" and "2008" in dropdlown
menu; then follow hyperlink of appropriate title). This legislation is sponsored by Senators
Kennedy, Reid, Leahy, Dodd, Harkin, Milkuiski, Bingaman, Murray, Reed, Clinton, Obama,
Sanders, Brown, and Whitehouse. See S. 3398, 110Oth Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).
Senators Kennedy and Representative Waxman filed an amicus brief in Riegel, commenting
on congressional intent in enacting the Medical Device Safety Act to amend the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See Brief of Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Representative Henry
A. Waxman, as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners, Riegel v. Medtronic, Ic., 128 S. Ct. 999
(2008) (No. 06-179) [hereinafter Brief of Senator Edward M. Kennedy].
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remains an open question. Nonetheless, as important as it is to engage
in close doctrinal and textual analyses over constitutional federalism,
it is perhaps equally important to understand the political alliances
influencing the evolution of preemption doctrine.

1. THE ROAD TO PREEMPTION: THE CONSERVATIVE PROGRAM FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
And ever since John Roberts was appointed chief justice in
2005, the court has seemed only more receptive to business
concerns. . .. One thing, however, is certain already: the
transformation of the court was no accident. It represents
the culmination of a carefully planned, behind-the-scenes
campaign over several decades to change not only the
5
courts but also the country's political culture.'
A. The Development of a Pro-BusinessAgenda
As Jeffrey Rosen has noted, over the past twenty-five years the
conservative, corporate, and business communities have engaged in a
concerted, deliberative campaign to reform civil justice in the United
States. These efforts have been manifested through an array of
institutional initiatives and advocacy efforts. In parallel counterpart to
the conservative movement's efforts to achieve civil justice reform,
various liberal constituencies have engaged in similar efforts to
achieve a separate vision of civil justice. Nevertheless, the Court's
recent rulings have focused more attention on the pro-business ethos
pervading the current Court.
Rosen articulates a particular narrative related to the development
of the late twentieth-century business orientation of the Supreme
Court. In Rosen's narrative, the roots of this tectonic shift may be
traced precisely back to August 23, 1971, when then-attorney Lewis
Powell sent a memo to Eugene Snydor at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce that described an attack on the United States economic
system. 16 In his memorandum, Powell urged that the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce "begin a multifront lobbying campaign on behalf of
business interests."'17 According to Rosen, Powell perceived a need to
counter the forces of "Naderism" and various established left-leaning

15 Rosen, supra note 10, at 40, 4 1.
6 Id. at 4 1.
17 Id.
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consumer advocacy groups such as Public Citizen.'18 And, as Rosen
points out, two months after Powell's famous memorandum to the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, President Richard Nixon appointed
Powell to the U.S. Supreme Court.' 9 By implication, the Court
acquired a friend of the business community.
In Rosen's narrative, the pro-business lobbying efforts of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce got off to a slow start in the 1980s, as the
Chamber learned and developed various means for influencing
decision-making in multiple forums. In the judicial arena, lobbying
efforts required the development of institutional means for advocating
pro-business positions. Until the mid-1980s, there were few, if any,
law firms with specialized practice groups that focused on arguing
business cases before the Court, but this would change in the ensuing
two decades.2
By the mid-1980s, this institutional gap began to be remedied as
high-profile Washington attorneys moved into law firms that
developed such specialized business practices, including litigation of
high-profile cases before the Supreme Court and appellate courts. As
Rosen suggests, this shift was signaled when Rex Lee, President
Ronald Reagan's Solicitor General, left the government in 1985 to set
up a Supreme Court appellate practice at the Washington law firm of
21
Sidley and Austin. In the ensuing years, conservative former law
clerks, especially former law clerks of conservative Supreme Court
Justices, would either join prestigious Washington practices or the
Chamber of Commerce itself.22 Moreover, the business community
advanced its interests through the development of a cadre of
experienced Supreme Court advocates and repeat-players,
exemplified by such prominent litigators as Ted Olson, another
Republican former Solicitor General.2
Moreover, Rosen suggests that the Chamber of Commerce's
efforts, and the concomitant institutionalization of pro-business
advocacy in the judicial arena, were additionally inspired by the
conservative movement's thwarted efforts at securing a Supreme
Court seat for Judge Robert Bork in 1987. After the Bork nomination
defeat, the Chamber set up a formal process for endorsing Supreme
Court and other federal judicial nominees.2
18

Id.

19 Id.
20 Id.

at 42.
Id.
22 Id. at 41-42.
23 Id. at 44-45.
24 Id. at 42.
21

20091

845

2009]
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS84

In addition to its efforts in the judicial arena, the Chamber of
Commerce in the ensuing two decades adopted concerted lobbying
efforts in both Congress and the Executive branch. As the result of
these various lobbying efforts, Rosen concludes that the pro-business
advocacy of the Chamber of Commerce and similar conservative
advocacy groups has been highly effective in accomplishing an
especially favorable track record in recent Court opinions. Among the
business community's successes has been a cutback on consumer
lawsuits, restrictive Supreme Court decisions relating to punitive
damages, and last Term's preemption decision in Rie gel.2
For Rosen, then, the Court's restrictive views on preemption
doctrine, illustrated in the Riegel decision, exemplify the Court's
pro-business tilt in recent decades. Rosen's narrative is compelling,
but this narrative is somewhat incomplete in describing the political
backdrop that inspired judicial scrutiny of preemption doctrine in the
early twenty-first century. In addition, with the political shift in
control of government after the November 2008 elections, coupled
with the Court's subsequent decisions in both Altria and Wyeth, the
pro-business narrative of the Court now has become more nuanced
and complicated.
B. The 1980s Civil Justice Reform Critique: The Contract with
America and the Roots of a Preemption Strategy
Rosen's narrative of the historical development of a pro-business
Supreme Court at the close of the twentieth century is both interesting
and compelling. In attempting to explain restrictive preemption
decisions in recent years, commentators such as Rosen and others
tend to focus only on judicial initiatives by the conservative and
business communities. However, there is a more complex parallel
narrative of reform efforts that supplements and enhances this nearly
exclusive focus on developments in judicial lobbying.
This narrative of the preemption story unfolds against a more
complicated political back-story with roots in the conservative 1980s
movement heralded under the general rubric of "civil justice
reform."926 Properly understood, restrictive preemption doctrine is the
lineal and philosophical (as well as instrumental) descendant of the
1980s conservative movement for civil justice reform. This reform
movement has endured for over thirty years and embraces efforts by

Id. at 44-45, 66-7 1.
See generally Symposium, Civil Justice Reform,
civil justice reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s).
25
26

I11REV. LrrIci.

165 (1992) (discussing
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multiple actors in multiple forums to reconfigure civil justice delivery
in the United States.2
The conservative movement for civil justice reform embodies not
only a pro-business ethos but also embraces an array of attitudes
about civil litigation and civil justice in the United States. The 1980s
movement for civil justice reform embraced a sweeping critique of
the delivery of civil justice and inspired a political movement to
accomplish wholesale reform of civil justice in the United States.
According to the civil justice critique, the United States is the most
litigious country in the world, and Americans are the most litigious
people on the planet, willing and encouraged to sue anyone who
might conceivably be held responsible for alleged grievances.2
Americans are encouraged to file civil litigation because of easy
access to plaintiffs' counsel, lenient rules on client solicitation and
attorney advertising, and a contingency fee system that provides little
or no risk to potential plaintiffs to bring suit. The attorney fee
structure and attorney advertising also encourage "entrepreneurial"
plaintiffs' attorneys to seek litigious clients with grievances. As a
consequence of this over-litigiousness, courts are flooded with too
29
many lawsuits, many of which are frivolous.

Among many types of litigation, of particular baneful effect on
business interests are frivolous tort suits and vexatious securities class
actions. Plaintiffs are encouraged to pursue litigation inspired by the
potential for large compensatory damage verdicts as well as large
punitive or hedonic damages awards. Tort litigation is plagued by lax
evidentiary standards that allow juries to hear 'junk science" in
support of plaintiffs' claims. The transaction costs of litigating civil
suits fall disproportionately on corporate defendants, who often carry
the burden of expensive and intrusive civil discovery. In addition to
27 See generally STEPHANIE MENCRMER, BLOCKING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY AND ITS CORPORATE ALLIES ARE TAKING AWAY YOUR RIGHT TO SUE

(2006); Symposium on Civil Justice Reform, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1285 (1994) (discussing the
ongoing civil justice reform movement); see, e.g., Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the
Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1285, 1285 (1994) ("Across a constitutional
divide, Congress and the federal courts share a mutual obligation to ensure that our judicial
system offers all Americans justice in civil and criminal matters within a reasonable time and at
reasonable expense.").
28 Professor Deborah Rhode has attempted to rebalance the conservative critique of civil
justice delivery in the United States. See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil
Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 451-52
(2004) (describing all the canards of the conservative civil justice critique, and the various
lobbying efforts to achieve civil justice reform).
29 See MENCIMER, supra note 27, at 12. 132 (referring to complaints of frivolous
lawsuits); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Perils of Preemption, TRIAL, Sept. 2008, at 20, 20
(describing the "'.accountability crisis' . .. to shield corporate America from . . . 'burdensome
and unnecessary' regulatory responsibilities and 'frivolous' cormmon law tort liability").
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onerous transaction costs, defendants often settle civil lawsuits rather
than risk jury trials, participating in what some courts and
commentators have labeled "settlement blackmail."3
Finally, the civil justice critique includes criticism of aggregate
claims resolution, most notably class action litigation. Hence, the
potential for transforming ordinary, traditional one-on-one litigation
into a massive class action lawsuit poses the threat of truly calamitous
consequences for business or corporate entities. Indeed, all the
problems identified with traditional litigation increase exponentially
when pursued through class action suits. For corporate and business
defendants, the threat of potential class litigation is often enough to
precipitate a settlement. Class litigation emboldens plaintiffs and class
counsel to file strike suits against corporate defendants in the hopes of
a speedy and lucrative class-wide settlement.
This critique of the American civil justice system gained political
traction in the mid- 1980s and found its political expression during the
1988-1989 presidential campaign when the Republican presidential
ticket campaigned on a platform of civil justice reform. The campaign
for civil justice reform reached a famous apogee in 1991 when Vice
President Dan Quayle issued a wholesale attack on the legal
profession . 3 '1 Almost all the grievances that conservatives would
30 See WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS,
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 6 (2004) (alluding to the "widely circulating horror stories
about frivolous lawsuits, greedy lawyers, shameless plaintiffs, and duped jurors."), cited in
McGarity, supra note 29, at 20 n. 1.
31 Vice President Dan Quayle, Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting
(Aug. 13, 1991) (discussing Justice Clarence Thomas's confirmation to the Supreme Court); see
also Andrew Blum, ABA Takes Softer Stand on Quayle, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1991, at 3
(discussing Quayle's speech at the ABA's annual meeting); Steven Brostoff, Push by Bush
Urges on Tort Reform Movement, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK &
BENEFITS MGMT., Sept. 2, 1991, at 5 (discussing reaction to Quayle's proposals); Dawn Ceol,
Quayle Urges Reform of Civil Justice System, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at A4 (reporting on
Quayle's speech); Rupert Cornwell, U.S. Plans Radical Legal Reforms, INDEP., Aug. 14, 1991,
at 10 (reporting on Quayle's speech); Mary Jane Fisher, Civil Justice Reform Plan Introduced
by VP Quayle, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Aug. 19,
1991, at I (discussing support from insurance groups for Quayle's speech); Julie Johnson
& Ratu Kamiani, Do We Have Too Many Lawyers?, TIME, Aug. 26, 1991, at 54 (noting
pro-business bias of proposed Quayle reform efforts); David Margolick, Address by Quayle on
Justice Proposals Irks Bar Association, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al (reporting on
Quayle's speech and opposition to proposals); Greg Rushford, Touting Tort Reform, LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1991, at 5 (discussing tort lawyers' general endorsement of the
recommendations for civil justice reform by the President's Council on Competitiveness);
Martin Schram, Call It Danforth in the Lawyers' Den, NEWSDAY, Aug. 29, 1991, at 126
(discussing favorable reaction to Quayle's speech); Roush Vance, New Bar Chief Wants to
Boost Image of Attorneys and Promote Professionalism,MICH. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 23, 1990, at
Supp. 3B (discussing comments at Michigan State Bar meeting on Quayle's speech and decline
in professionalism); At a Glance: Legal Affairs: First, Sock The Lawyers, 23 NAT'L J. 2041
(1991) (reporting on Quayle's speech); For the Record, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1991, at A20
(providing excerpts from Quayle's speech to the ABA); Quayle Outlines Recommendations for
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advance against civil justice delivery in the United States found
expression during the Bush-Quayle administration, culminating in a
report from the President's Council on Competitiveness delineating
obstacles to a competitive economy and outlining proposals for civil
justice reform.3 Although the philosophical roots of the civil justice
reform movement were articulated under the Bush-Quayle
administration, conservative interests would accomplish scant
substantive legislative reforms during this period.
Instead, the only civil reform effort to achieve legislative approval
during the Bush-Quayle administration was the enactment of the Civil

Justice Reform Act of

1990.33

Although labeled a "Civil Justice

Reform Act," this legislation actually mandated self-examination and

docket reform in the ninety-four federal district

courts. 34

While each

federal district court was required to propose and promulgate
measures, programs, and procedures to expedite the procedural
resolution of cases on their dockets, the Civil Justice Reform Act did
not address the core substantive grievances of the conservative civil
justice reform movement identified in the Bush-Quayle report.3

Reforming Product Liability, WKLY. Bus. AVIATION, Aug. 19, 1991, at 74 (reporting on
Quayle's speech and products liability tort reform); Editorial, Taking the Lead, NAT'L L.J., Nov.
4, 1991, at 12 (describing positive reaction to Quayle's speech); Editorial, The Costs of
Lawyering, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 19, 1991, at 20 (describing positive reaction to
Quayle's speech).
32 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN

AMERICA (1991). But cf. Avert Cohn, Letter to the Editor, Civil-Justice Report Flawed, LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 23, 199 1, at 28 (criticizing Quayle's speech and the Agenda).
33Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Plub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also S. REF. No. 10 1416 (1990)
(legislative history of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990); H.R. REF. No. 10 1-732 (1990)
(legislative history of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990). Title I of the Judicial
Improvements Act contains various provisions relating to the creation and implementation of
expense and delay reduction plans for the federal district courts across the country. See Pub. L.
No. 101-650, §§ 101-106, 104 Stat. 5089, 5089-98. The popular name of Title I is the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 101, 104 Stat. 5089, 5089. "Civil Justice
Expense and Delay Reduction Plans" are authorized by amendment to Title 28 of the United
States Code. See Pub. L. No. 10 1-650, § 103, 104 Stat. 5089, 5090-96 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§
471-482).
34See § 103(b) (requiring that each federal district court implement a civil justice expense
and delay reduction plan within three years after enactment of the legislation); see also 28
U.S.C. § 477 (2006) (requiring the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the
Federal Judicial Center to transmit the model plans and reports to the House and Senate
judiciary committees); id. § 479(a) (requiring the Judicial Conference of the United States to
prepare a comprehensive report on all plans received from the district courts within four years of
enactment of the legislation).
35See generally Mark Ballard, Bill to Adid U.S. Judges Shortchanges Texas by 6;
Legislation Would Add 3 New Courts in Southern District, 1 in Western, TEX. LAW., June 18,
1990, at 4 (commenting on earlier version of Senator Biden's bill); David Bauman, Biden
Unveils Litigation Bill, Gannett News Service (Jan. 25, 1990) (discussing the Biden bill);
Marcia Coyle & Fred Strasser, Senate Sets Its Sights on Delays in Civil Trials, NAT'L. L.J., July
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The conservative civil justice reform movement ought to have lost
political currency with the change in administration effectuated by the
election of Democratic President William Clinton in 1992 .3
However, with the 1994 mid-term elections creating a Republican
37
majority in Congress , particularly in the House of Representatives,
the civil justice reform movement experienced a startling
revitalization. As a consequence of his ascendancy to Speaker of the
House, Congressman Newt Gingrich became the chief spokesperson,
articulator, and advocate for the conservative civil justice reform
movement.3
The revitalized movement found expression in Representative
Gingrich's proposed "Contract with America,",40 a document that
.38

23, 1990, at 5 (discussing Biden bill and noting opposition from Judicial Conference of United
States and American Bar Association's Board of Governors); Stephen Labaton, Business and
the Law: Biden 's Challenge to Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1990, at D2 (reporting on
Civil Justice Reform Act and judicial conference opposition); Richard A. Rothrnan, Civil Justice
Reform Act: Too Little, Too Fast, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1990, at 2 (providing early criticism of
Civil Justice Reform Act); Fred Strasser et al., Conference OKs Plan to Cut Court Costs,
Delays, NAT'L. L.J., May 21, 1990, at 5 (noting Judicial Conference opposition to Civil Justice
Reform Act and setting forth Conference's own proposals); Biden Introduces Court Reform Bill,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1990, at A2 (announcing the Civil Justice Reform Act); Legislation:
Mixed Bag of Changes Designed to Improve Federal Practice, 59 U.S. L. WK. 2419 (Jan. 15,
1991) (describing provisions of Judicial Improvements Act of 1990); Editorial, Proceed with
Caution, N.J. L.J., Mar. 8, 1990, at 6 (criticizing Brookings Report and Civil Justice Reform
Act).
36 See, e.g., Kevin Sack, Quayle Says Letter Shows Lawyers 'Own Clinton,' N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 1992, at A16 (reporting on Vice President Dan Quayle's efforts to portray candidate
Governor Bill Clinton as "in the pocket" of plaintiff trial lawyers and opposing civil justice
reform efforts to curb litigation excesses and abuses).
37 See Adam Clymer, G.O.P. Celebrates Its Sweep to Power; Clinton Vows to Find
Common Ground; Committee ChairmanshipsAre Sure Spoils of Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
1994, at AlI (reporting on Republican sweep of Congressional and gubernatorial electoral races).
38 Id. (reporting a Republican election landslide resulting in total of 227 seats for
Republicans and 199 for Democrats, with eight House races yet undecided, as well as
Republicans gaining eight additional seats in the Senate, for a 53-46 Republican Senate
majority).
39 See Adam Clymer, Gingrich Moves Quickly to Put Stamp on House, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 1994, at Al (listing Gingrich initiatives for new Congress); Adam Clymer, Republicans All
for One, and the One is Gingrich, House Speaker-Designate Sets His Agenda and Issues
Challengesfor His Party, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1994, at AlI (reporting the choice of Gingrich as
Speaker of the House of Representatives); Catherine S. Manegold, Gingrich, Now a Giant,
Claims Victor's Spoils, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1994, at I11("Mr. Gingrich said he plans to have
his "Contract With America"-t4he platform on which he tried to get Congressional candidates
to run this year-read at the start of business every day in Congress for the first 100 days of the
next session"); David E. Rosenbaum et al., New Majority's Agenda: Substantial Changes May
Be Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1l, 1994, at A26 (discussing upcoming legislative initiatives based
on the "Contract with America"); Katharine Q. Seelye, Republicans Plan Ambitious Agenda in
Next Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1994, at Al (reporting that Republican leadership
announced measures to "push through Newt Gingrich's 'Contract With America' in 100 days").
40 See Republican Members of the House of Representatives, Republican Contract with
America, http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.htmnl (last visited Aug. 9, 2009).
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some 300 Republican legislators signed and advocated. Foremost
among the contractual provisions were eight reforms directed at
Congress itself, specifically the ways in which Congress functioned . 4 1
In addition to the eight fundamental reforms directed to Congress,
the "Contract with America" also set forth ten legislative initiatives to
be proposed within the first 100 days of the 104th Congress to
advance the cause of civil justice.4 These proposed bills included
"The Common Sense Legal Reforms Act"' (CSLRA).4 The overall
spirit animating the CSLRA was to curb the presumed excesses and
abuses of the overly-litigious American society."4 Basically, the
CSLRA embodied the core principles animating the conservative
critique of civil justice in the United States, as refined over a
decade.4
To this end, the CSLRA proposed altering attorney fee awards to

reflect a loser-pays

rule; 46

adding additional provisions to assure

41 The "Contract with America" enumerated eight fundamental reform proposals, all
directed to the reform of Congress, and including provisions that would: (1) "require all laws
that apply to the rest of the country also apply equally to the Congress;" (2) "select a major,
independent auditing firm to conduct a comprehensive audit of Congress for waste, fraud or
abuse;" (3) "cut the number of House committees, and cut committee staff by one-third;" (4)
"limit the terms of all committee chairs;" (5) "ban the casting of proxy votes in committee;" (6)
"require committee meetings to be open to the public;" (7) "require a three-fifths majority vote
to pass a tax increase;" and (8) "guarantee an honest accounting of our Federal Budget by
implementing zero base-line budgeting." Id.
The Contract then set forth ten proposed legislative bills to be proposed in Congress during
the legislature's first 100 days. These legislative proposals included "The Common Sense Legal
Reform Act," which embodied all the platforms of the Republican civil justice reform program.
Id.
42 These proposed legislative initiatives included: (1) "The Fiscal Responsibility Act," (2)
"The Taking Back Our Streets Act," (3) 'The Personal Responsibility Act," (4) 'The Family
Reinforcement Act," (5) "The American Dream Restoration Act," (6) "The National Security
Restoration Act," (7) "The Senior Citizens Fairness Act," (8) "The Job Creation and Wage
Enhancement Act," (9) "The Commnon Sense Legal Reform Act," and (10) "The Citizen
Legislature Act." Id. Despite clear legislative majorities, none of these legislative initiatives
would be enacted into law between 1995 and 2000. In some cases, President Clinton vetoed
various versions of these proposed initiatives.
43 See i. This bill originally was introduced on January 4, 1995. See H.R. 10, 104th
Cong. (I1st Sess. 1995). The bill's purpose was "[tlo reform the Federal civil justice system; to
reform product liability law". Id. See generally Patrick E. Longan, Congress, the Courts, and
the Long Range Plan, 46 Am. U. L. REv. 625, 645-53 (1997) (describing the Common Sense

Legal Reforms Act and the history of the legislation); Carl Tobias,

Reforming Common Sense

Legal Reforms, 30 CONN. L. REV. 537 (1998) (giving a general description of The Common
Sense Legal Reforms Act provisions and history of the legislation); Carl Tobias, Common Sense
and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REv. 699 (1995) (same).
44 See H.R. 10 (stating in the preamble that it is a bill "[t]o reform the Federal civil justice
system; to reform product liability law").
43 See, e.g., Peter Passell, Civil Justice System Is Overhaul Target, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 27,
1995. at B7 (reporting on the introduction of The Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995);
see also Anthony Ramirez, Consumer CrusaderFeels a Chill in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31, 1995, at Fl (describing interview with Ralph Nader and risks to consumer movement posed
by conservative civil justice reform initiatives).
46 H.R. 10 § 101 ("Award of Attorney's Fee to Prevailing Party in Federal Civil Diversity
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accountability in the determination of attorney fees ;47 curbing the use
of junk science and other dubious expert testimony in civil

litigation ;4 8 reforming product liability

law;49

limiting punitive

damage awards ;50 and enhancing notice and statute of limitations
requirements . 5 1 Title 11 of the proposed CSLRA addressed reform of
securities class litigation, 52 and RICO claims against defendants were
addressed in Title 1.53
Consequently, an embedded value of the conservative reform
movement was to restrict access to justice through various means. It
is interesting to note, however, that use of preemption doctrine was
not among the numerous proposed initiatives of the civil justice
reform agenda in the early 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, the
philosophical roots of this access-limiting concept were latent in this
earlier civil justice reform movement.
Preemption doctrine appears for the first time as a strategy to
achieve the conservative vision of civil justice reform with the
ascendancy of Representative Gingrich in the 104th Congress, the
"Contract with America," and the new Republican majority in the
House of Representatives. In this regard, the 104th Congress
proposed to create sweeping new federal substantive products liability
law, and to link new federal tort law to a preemption doctrine that
would supersede state law. With regard to preemption of state law in
derogation of federal tort law, the proposed CSLRA provided:
APPLICABILITY AND PREEMPTION.-This section governs any
product liability action brought in any State or Federal Court
against any manufacturer or seller of a product on any theory
for harm caused by the product. This section supersedes State
law only to the extent that State law applies to an issue
covered by this section. Any issue that is not covered by this

Litigation").

Id. § 104 ("Attorney Accountability").
Id. § 102 ("Honesty in Evidence").
49 Id. § 103 ("Product Liability Reform").
50 Id. § 103(c) ("Limitations on Punitive Damages").
51 Id. § 105 ("Notice Required Before Commencement of Civil Action"); id. § 105(d)

47

48

("Statute of Limitations").
52 Id. §§ 201-206. These sections contain provisions with the colorful titles "Prevention of
Lawyer-Driven Litigation," id. § 202, "Prevention of Abusive Practices that Foment Litigation,"
id. § 203, "Prevention of 'Fishing Expedition' Lawsuits," id. §204, and "Establishment of 'Safe
Harbor' for Predictive Statements," id. § 205.
53 Id. § 107 ("Amendment to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act").
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section shall be governed by otherwise applicable State or
54
Federal law.

Thus, the concept of preemption doctrine as a conservative civil
justice reform strategy concretely emerged in 1995. However, during
the Clinton presidential years from 1995 through 2001, the Gingrich
Congress failed to enact most of its civil justice reform initiatives,~
including various versions of the CSLRA.5 In this period, the only
reform initiative that managed to be enacted into law (and not vetoed
by President Clinton) was the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995.~
This inability and failure of the conservative Gingrich Congress to
enact sweeping civil justice reform led to what many commentators
have characterized as "stealth tort reform" through legislative and
administrative means, including new initiatives utilizing preemption
doctrine. 5 8
C. The Strategy of the Preemption Campaign
Commentators have well-documented the evolving conservative
campaign to achieve tort reform by other means-that is, through
preemption doctrine.5 While commentators generally agree that the
Supreme Court's 1992 landmark decision Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.6 marked a new judicial receptivity to preemption arguments,
commentators also agree that the conservative agenda for civil justice
reform became an especially high priority with the election of
54
55

Id. § 103(a).

See Longan, supra note 43, at 646 ("Thbe various procedural reforms that were part of
the original . . . 'Contract with America' were incorporated into several bills for separate
consideration. Only the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 has become law."
(footnote omitted)). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 became law in
December of 1995. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 78u-5 (2006)).
56 See Peter Passell, Economic Scene: A Dole Bill to Revise Tort Law May Lure Some
Centrist Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1996, at D2 (describing Dole legislative initiative for
tort reform in light of expected Clinton veto).
57 See supra note 55.
59 See, e.g., MARGARET H. CLUNE, STEALTH TORT REFORM: H4OW THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION'S AGGRESSIVE USE OF THE PREEMPTION DocrRiNE HURTS CONSUMERS (Ctr.
for Progressive Regulation, White Paper No. 403, Oct. 2004), www.progressivereform.org/
articles/preemption.pdf;, McGarity, supra note 29, at 25-26 ("Having failed to persuade a
reluctant Congress to enact an aggressive civil justice reform agenda, the Bush administration in
2002 initiated an equally aggressive program of stealth tort 'reform' through regulatory
preemption.").
59 See, e.g., Louis M. Bograd, Taking on Big Pharma--andthe FDA, TRIAL, Mar. 2007, at
30; Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 62-63; McGarity, supra note 29, at 21-22; Sharkey,
Federalism in Action, supra note 6.
S505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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President George W. Bush in 2000 .61 A newly-revitalized preemption
strategy arose, which was pursued through three institutional means:
(1) legislative initiatives, (2) administrative initiatives, and (3)
judicial pronouncements. 62
During the Bush administration, conservative advocates pursued
civil justice reform through congressional legislation to add express
preemptive language to various federal regulatory schemes.6
Examples of such statutory initiatives include amendments to the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA")
regulations relating to requirements for vehicle roof strength.64 A
proposed amendment to the final roof crush regulations would
expressly preempt all future common law roof strength claims.
Moreover, all subsequent safety regulations issued by NHTSA
included language to expressly preempt state law claims.6
In addition to direct legislative proposals amending statutes to add
express preemption language, another notable feature of the Bush-era
civil justice reform agenda was for regulatory agencies to insert
preemptive language in regulatory preambles as a part of agency
rulemaking. This phenomenon has been labeled "preemption by
preamble," and has been well-documented by several preemption
66
scholars, most notably Professor Catherine Sharkey.
The second arena in which conservative civil justice reform
advocates pursued aggressive preemption doctrine during the Bush
years was through the appointment of strong tort reform proponents
to the Department of Justice and legal offices of federal regulatory
67
agencies. Not only did these conservative appointees seed federal
agencies with civil justice reform advocates, but more importantly
these conservative appointees succeeded in shifting agency positions
on preemption doctrine. Thus, for example, the appointment of
conservative personnel was crucial in accomplishing a reversal of
61 McGarity, supra note 29, at 21 ("During his 2000 presidential campaign, George W.
Bush complained that 'vexatious litigation' was threatening the economic vitality of the
American economy, and he promised to make tort 'reform' a high priority in his presidency.").
62 See id.
63 Id. at 21-22.
61 NH-TSA Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg.
49223 (proposed Aug. 23, 2005).
65 McGarity, supra note 29, at 22.
66 See Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 6 (describing the use of preemptive
language in regulatory preambles as "silent tort reform"; describing preemption language in
rulemaking by three federal agencies: the Food and Drug Administration, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission); see also
McGarity, supra note 29, at 21-22.
61 See McGarity, supra note 29, at 21 ("Once in the Oval Office, Bush appointed strong
proponents of tort 'reform' to key positions in the Department of Justice and the legal offices of
many federal agencies.").
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policy by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which shifted
agency support in favor of implied preemption doctrine . 68 These
agency policy shifts would prove to be especially important as
agencies, especially the FDA, began to appear as advocates in
preemption litigation.6
Finally, conservative preemption strategy has been pursued
through advocacy in the litigation arena. During the Bush
administration especially, judicial advocacy of a conservative
pro-preemption position has been urged against the backdrop of the
Court's historical presumption against preemption . 70 But beginning
with the Court's preemption decision in Cipollone7, the Supreme
Court and federal appellate courts have issued a series of preemption
decisions largely upholding the preemptive effect of various federal
statutes .7 The Court's recent Altria and Wyeth decisions, however,

68 See James T. O'Reilly, Drug Review 'Behind the Curtain": A Response to Professor
Struve, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1076-77 (2008) ("Bush administration appointees include
recent FDA Commissioners Andrew von Eschenbach and Mark McClellan-both Bush
supporters from Texas-as well as conservative FDA counsel. These and other Bush appointees
have led to a shift in FDA policy, which now supports the implied preemption doctrine."
(footnotes omnitted)).
69 See Bograd, supra note 59, at 30-31 (describing the shift in FDA policy with the advent
of the Bush administration: "[tlhings began to change shortly after George W. Bush became
president. It started with a series of amicus briefs that the FDA filed in pending tort cases. The
Bush FDA began to take the position that certain products liability claims seeking to hold drug
manufacturers liable for failure to provide adequate warnings of a drug's dangers conflicted
with-and were preempted by-federal drug labeling regulations.").
70 See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)
.....
[Wie start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
(quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)))). Professor Chemerinsky has noted that the Court's
preemption decisions since 2000 are, at the very least "inconsistent with the Court's oft-stated
presumption against preemption." Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 62; see also Wolfmnan, supra
note 6, at 21 ("[Elven after Garmnon, the prevailing assumption in the courts was that regulatory
standards and state compensation schemes occupied separate spheres. Indeed, until the 1990s,
the Supreme Court had never held a state law tort claim preempted by federal regulation, at least
not where federal law itself did not provide a right of action for damages." (footnote omitted)).
71 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
72 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (upholding express preemption
under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 128 S.
Ct. 989 (2008) (holding that the Federal Aviation Administration Act of 1994 preempts state
law regulating the shipment of tobacco products); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525
(2001) (holding that federal law preempts state law regulating location of cigarette
advertisements); Geier v. Am. Motor Honda Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000) (holding that federal
law preempts state products liability lawsuit over unsafe vehicle, despite statutory provision that
expressly provided that "'.[clompliance with' a federal safety standard 'does not exempt any
person from any liability under common law"' (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)) (brackets
in original)); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (invalidating
Massachusetts law that prohibited companies doing business with Burma because of Burma's
human rights record).
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may signal a more nuanced or at least more complicated approach to
preemption claims.7

HI. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 1: THE CONSERVATIVE

ALLIANCE

The purpose of the preceding discussion was to provide an
historical context in which to appreciate how preemption doctrine
engendered a set of strange bedfellow advocates during the first part
of the twenty-first century. As the narrative suggests, advocacy in
favor of robust federal preemption of state law claims did not
suddenly emerge during the Bush-Cheney administration, but rather
had philosophical roots extending back at least into the 1980s. And,
as recently as the mid- 1980s, federal courts maintained a presumption
against federal preemption of state law claims.
During the Bush-Quayle administration, pro-business interests
developed a conservative critique of civil justice delivery in the
United States, along with a comprehensive program for civil justice
reform. With the failure to accomplish procedural and substantive
civil justice reform through legislative initiatives--during both the
first Bush and Clinton administrations-by the year 2000
conservatives had shifted to a strategy of accomplishing civil justice
reform through narrowing access to courts. For the pro-business
community, these efforts took the form of advocating robust
preemption doctrine in various arenas.
However, the shifting sands of preemption doctrine confound
ordinary explanation, in part because its proponents seem to embrace
politically and ideologically inconsistent positions. For example, the
longstanding Supreme Court presumption against preemption of state
law claims supports a strong theory of Tenth Amendment rights in
areas traditionally reserved to the states, such as police powers and
the regulation of the health and welfare of state citizens. Moreover,
states' rights advocates support the ability of local state judges and
juries to adjudicate the rights of state citizens. Hence, committed
states' rights advocates ought to embrace a robust position against
federal preemption of state law claims and in favor of state autonomy
in police, regulatory, and judicial affairs.
Additionally, deference to the parallel state authority to enact local
regulatory schemes supports the oft-stated goal of permitting states to
73 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (holding that FDA labeling requirements
did not preempt state claimant's inadequate warning claim under state law); Altria Group, Inc.
v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) (holding that cigarette smokers' state action under the Maine
Unfair Trade Practices Act was not expressly preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act).
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serve as laboratories for experiment and change. This applies with
equal force to the ability of local judges and juries to interpret, apply,
and enforce local regulations. Again, states' rights advocates ought to
eschew the application of federal preemption doctrine to effectively
overrule such local control and experimentation.
Finally, federal preemption doctrine enhances the consolidation of
federal power in the New Deal administrative state.7 Precisely
because application of federal preemption strengthens the federal
regulatory state, conservative advocates who believe in limited
government ought to avoid or resist federal preemption.7
Notwithstanding these ideological verities, civil justice reform
conservatives and pro-business interests instead have proven to be the
most ardent advocates for application of federal preemption doctrine.
In so doing, conservative arguments have been channeled into
endorsing the scope, authority, and probity of the federal regulatory
state. The conservative support for robust federal preemption
doctrine, therefore, ironically has cloaked conservatives with the
unusual mantle of closet federal regulators.
A. Pro-FederalRegulatory Advocacy: A Tale of Pro-BusinessFriends
of the Court
The array of amicus curiae briefs filed in the Court's last three
major preemption cases-Riegel, Altria, and Wyeth-illustrates the
seemingly ironic position of pro-business interests in endorsing both
express and implied federal preemption. In addition, the am-icus
curiae briefs also nicely illustrate the tableaux of the usual third-party
repeat players that may be expected to appear in all major preemption
appellate litigation.
74

In describing this historical shift, Professor Epstein has commented:

Historically, the consolidation of the New deal administrative state meant the
federal government faced few, if any, limitations on the scope of its pox~er given the
expansive reading of the Commerce Clause. This rapid expansion of federal power
took place in an environment highly sympathetic to regulation at both the national
and the state levels. state powers of regulation have never been constrained by the
federal constitutional doctrine of enumerated powers. But post-1937, the broad
construction of the Commerce Clause gave the federal government total power to
regulate in areas formerly reserved to the states, except in the most marginal of
cases.
Epstein, supra note 7, at 56 (footnote omritted).
75 Noting this anomaly, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has suggested that the recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence in preemption cases embodies this ideological conflict: "One would expect
that a conservative Court, committed to protecting states' ights, would narrow the scope of
federal preemption. After all, a good way to empower state governments is to restrict the federal
government's reach. Restricting preemption gives state governments more autonomy."
Chemerintksy, supra note 11, at 62.
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In Riegel, four major institutional advocacy groups appeared as
amici in support of the respondent Medtronic, Inc. The Riegel
litigation presented the issue of whether the Medical Device
Amendments of 197676 provided express preemption of an array of
New York state law claims sounding in "strict liability; breach of
implied warranty; . . . negligence in the design, testing, inspection,
distribution, labeling, marketing, and sale of the [Medtronic]
catheter"; as well as a loss of consortium claim. 77 The Supreme Court,
in an 8-1 decision, upheld the lower court decisions that had
dismissed the litigation based on express preemption grounds.7
The amici in support of Medtronic' s express preemption defense
included the pro-business Chamber of Commerce of the United
States 7, the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. ("PLAC"),8 the
Washington Legal Foundation, 81 and the United States (appearing on
behalf of the FDA).8 In addition, two other entities with broad
general economic interests in the Rie gel litigation also appeared as
amici in support of Medtronic.8
The Chamber of Commerce's amicus brief in Riegel sets forth the
pro-business interest of the Chamber in preemption cases 84and states
that preemption doctrine protects the Chamber's members "against
the imposition by state and local governments of burdensome,
divergent and even conflicting requirements" (in this case relating to
76
77
71
79

21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
Riegel v.Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct 999, 1005-06 (2008).
Id. at 1011. See generally Sharkey, What Riegel Portends, supra note 6.

See B~rief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Respondent, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179) [hereinafter Brief of
the Chamber of Commerce in Riegel).
80 See Brief of Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Respondent, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179) [hereinafter Brief of Product Liability
Advisory Council, Inc. in Riegel].
81 See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amnicus Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179) [hereinafter Brief of Washington Legal Foundation in
Riegel].
82 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179).
83 See Brief of Croplife America, American Chemistry Council, and Consumer Specialty
Products Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06179) [hereinafter Brief of Croplife America et al.]; Brief of the Advanced Medical Technology
Association (Advamed), DRI, Medmare, and the Medical Device Manufacturers Association
(MDMA) as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179)
[hereinafter Brief of the Advanced Medical Technology Association et al.].
84 A boilerplate recitation of the Chamber of Commerce's interests recites that the
Chamber "is the world's largest business federation" and represents "more than three million
companies and professional organizations of every size, in every industry, and from every
region of the country. An important function of the Chamber is to represent its members'
interests in matters before Congress, the Executive Branch, and the courts. To that end, the
Chamber regularly files amicus curiae briefs in cases that raise issues of vital concern to the
Nation's business community." Brief of the Chamber of Commerce in Riegel, supra note 79, at
I1.

858

858CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol.
59:4
ro.5:

pre-market approved devices).8 The PLAC similarly identified the
problem of inconsistent and conflicting state regulations as a burden
on its constituents. 86 In addition, PLAC positioned itself as a strong
supporter of the federal government as the primary protector of the
public health through the FDA, thereby arguing strongly on behalf of
federal preemption in order to enhance the "FDA' s ability to fulfill its
mandate in furtherance of public health."8
In Rie gel the Washington Legal Foundation identified itself as a
"non-profit public interest law and policy center" that "devotes a
substantial portion of its resources to defending free-enterprise,
88
individual rights, and a limited and accountable government.",
Notwithstanding its professed mission of defending individual rights
and limited government, the Washington Legal Foundation centered
its pro-preemption argument on the concept that individual freedom
and the American economy suffer when state law-particularly state
tort law-imposes "unnecessary layers of regulation that frustrates
the objectives or operation of specific federal regulatory regimes..
."89 As such, the Washington Legal Foundation, similar to PLAC and
the Chamber of Commerce, positioned itself as a federal regulatory
supporter.
The other business entities filing amici briefs in Riegel urged
application of federal preemption in the interests of consumer
protection, best achieved through national, uniform regulations.
Amici believe that consumer protection is significantly
strengthened by preemption of any type of tort claim that is
based on a state-law duty which diverges from, conflicts
with, or otherwise undermines federal safety regulation,
especially in areas such as product labeling and warnings.
85 Id.
86 PLAC indicates that its membership includes "more than 120 corporate members
representing a broad cross-section of American and international product manufacturers," as
well as "[sleveral hundred of the leading product liability defense attorneys." Brief of Product
Liability Advisory Council, Inc. in Riegel, supra note 80, at 1. In addition, PLAC indicates that
it has filed more than 800 amicus curiae briefs since 1983 in both state and federal court,
including sixty-nine briefs before the Supreme Court. Id.
87 Id. at 4 ("In enacting the express preemption provision in the MDA, Congress
determined that imposition of state requirements in addition to or different from federal
regulation would undermine public health. That judgment was correct. As FDA has stated in
this Court, in Courts of Appeals, and in the preamble to regulations, allowing state judges and
juries to second-guess the FDA's approval of PMAs, or to dictate different requirements than
FDA has imposed, impedes FDA's ability to fulfill its mandate in furtherance of public
health.").
88 Brief of Washington Legal Foundation in Riegel, supra note 81, at 1.
89 Id. The statement of interest adds: "such as (in this case) the Medical Device
Amendments (MDA)." Id.
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where nationally uniform regulation is critical to proper
90
usage.
In addition, federal preemption was urged as promoting the interests
of medical research and innovative technology. 9 1
In the Court's next term, the Chamber of Commerce,9 the
PLAC,9 and the Washington Legal Foundation9" would all appear
again as amici in support of Philip Morris USA, Inc. and the Altria
Group, Inc. in a preemption action involving the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act.9 These three amici were joined by
another repeat pro-business litigator, the National Association of
Manufacturers ("NAM"),9 as well as by a group of former federal
trade commissioners urging support for application of federal
preemption to state statutory claims, and illustrating the aggressive
advocacy of conservative agency capture.9
The Altria litigation raised the issue of whether the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act expressly or impliedly
preempted the ability of a state claimant to pursue a statutory claim
90 Brief of Croplife America et al., supra note 83, at 2.
91 The amici joined in the Brief of the Advanced Medical Technology Association urged
application of federal preemption to avoid the numerous harmful effects of state-law liability
risks. The amici identified the possible harmful effects of the availability of state law claims to
include: "(i) forgoing innovation [and] discouraging device development [by medical device
companies]; (ii) decreasing the availability of potentially beneficial medical treatments in the
United States, particularly those relating to women's health; (iii) increasing medical costs; and
(iv) encouraging 'defensive labeling' that interferes with rational prescribing decisions by
physicians." Brief of the Advanced Medical Technology Association et al., supra note 83, at 1.
92 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in
Support of Petitioners, Ailtria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) (No. 07-562)
[hereinafter Brief of Chamber of Commerce in Altria].
93 See Brief Amnicus Curiae of Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., in Support of
Petitioners, Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538 (No. 07-562) [hereinafter Brief of Product Liability Advisory
Council, Inc. in Altria].
94 See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538 (No. 07-562) [hereinafter Brief of Washington Legal Foundation in
Altria].
95 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207 (Supp. 2008).
96 See Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of Manufacturers in Support of
Reversal, Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538 (No. 07-562) [hereinafter Brief of the National Association of
Manufacturers]. NAM identifies itself as "the nation's oldest and largest industrial trade
association, representing small and large manufacturers in every industrial sector and in all fifty
states." Id. at 1. In addition, NAM states its mission "is to enhance the competitiveness of
manufacturers by shaping a legislative and regulatory environment conducive to the economic
growth of the United States and to increase understanding among policymnakers, the media, and
the public about the vital role of manufacturing in America's economic future and living
standards." Id.
97 See Brief of Former Commissioners and Senior Staff of the Federal Trade Comnmission
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538 (No. 07-562) [hereinafter Brief
of Former Commissioners and Senior Staff]. The formier Commissioners and staff identified
their interest in assisting the Court "in understanding the full context and nature of the FTC's
comprehensive regulatory control over the conduct at issue in this case." Id. at 2.
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under Maine's Unfair Trade Practices Act .98 The Court, in a 5-4
99
decision that relied heavily on the Court's precedent in Cipollone,
held that the plaintiff s statutory claim was not expressly or impliedly
preempted by the federal Act or by the Federal Trade Commnission's
actions in regulating cigarette content and adetsig'0
The amici briefs in support of federal preemption consistently
urged a positive federal regulatory argument, thereby rendering these
pro-business amici pseudo-federalists. The amici briefs in Altria
advanced three basic policy themes that were highly similar to those
articulated by the same amici in Riegel. First, national regulation is a
good thing. For example, the Chamber of Commerce urged that
statutes such as the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
"Censure uniform, nationwide standards."' 0 ' Second, uniform national
standards are desirable because "[tlhey promote efficiency, reduce
barriers to interstate commerce, and prevent consumer confusion."' 0
In a bid towards consumerism, the amici suggested that non-uniform
standards confuse and potentially injure consumers. 0 3 Third, federal
law cannot achieve the goals of uniform nationwide standards if
federal requirements can be "second-guessed by different juries under

§ 207 (Supp. 2008).
99 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
100Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 541, 545-5 1.
101Brief of Chamber of Commerce in Altria, supra note 92, at 2.
12d;see also Brief of Washington Legal Foundation in Altria, supra note 94, at 1.
Similar to its asserted interest in Riegel, the Washington Legal Foundation stated that the "WLF
is particularly concerned that individual freedom and the American economy both suffer when
state law, including state tort law, imposes an unnecessary layer of regulation that frustrates the
objectives or operation of federal regulatory programs." Id.
103TeChamber of Commerce stated:
98 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,

Congress has repeatedly recognized that, in today's integrated national economy.
uniform standards promote efficiency, avoid waste, and reduce barriers to interstate
commerce. Congress has also recognized that consumers would be harmed by the
confusion that results if the same products are labeled differently in different States.
The decision below cannot be reconciled with Congress' effort to avoid the injury to
the national economy that would result from such nonuniform labeling.
Brief of Chamber of Commerce in Airria, supra note 92, at 3. The former Commissioners
and staff of the FTC, in their amicus brief, similarly attempted to position their argument as a
pro-consumer stance: "In particular, amici are intimately familiar with the FTC's decades-long
efforts to ensure that consumers receive useful and accurate information about the tar and
nicotine smoke content of competing brands of cigarettes." Brief of Former Commissioners and
Senior Staff, supra note 97, at 2. The Washington Legal Foundation also cast itself as a
protector and defender of First Amendment free speech values, asserting that upholding
preemption of statutes, such as the Feder-al Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, which
promote uniform regulation, helps "to promote ... First Amendment values and, consequently,
commercial free speech rights by limiting state and local power to restrict commercial speech."
Brief of Washington Legal Foundation in Alttna, supra note 94, at 1-2.
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state tort law in different States," 0" a decidedly anti-states' autonomy
position.
In Altria, the National Association of Manufacturers asserted one
of the strongest pro-federal regulatory positions in its amicus brief,
predicting near-catastrophic results in the absence of federal
preemption of state law claims:
If allowed to stand, the ruling below would subvert the
functioning of a carefully crafted federal regulatory regime,
thwarting the federal government's goal of maintaining a
uniform national policy in the subject industry-with the
likely result being the regulatory destabilization of a myriad
of other industrial sectors under comprehensive federal
regulation and oversight.' 05
Finally, in perhaps the most closely watched preemption case of
the 2008-2009 Term, Wyeth v. Levine,"06 eight groups filed amicus
briefs on behalf of the Wyeth company. The amici can be clustered
into five groups: (1) the usual pro-business repeat players, the
Chamber of Commerce,'O' PLAC,'0 8 and the Washington Legal
Foundation"09; (2) two specialized pharmaceutical industry groups 1 10;
(3) the United States government' 11; (4) economic professors" 2 ; and
3
(5) a defense bar advocacy coalition."
104Brief of Chamber of Commerce in Altria, supra note 92, at 2; see also Brief of Product
Liability Advisory Council, Inc. in Altria, supra note 93, at 2 ("Further, many PLAC members
belong to heavily-regulated industries, and PLAC has a compelling interest in ensuring that
express preemption provisions are interpreted in a way that does not frustrate the purposes of
federal regulations and subject its members to conflicting requirements set by individual juries
applying the laws of 50 states."); Brief of the National Association of Manufacturers, supra note
96, at 2 ("Manufacturers need the assurance of the Court that in relying upon the guidance of
federal regulators, they will not expose themselves to state law liability in different courts across
the country."); Brief of Former Commissioners and Senior Staff, supra note 97, at 6 ('The
imposition of state-law liability for such conduct would therefore interfere with and frustrate the
accomplishment of the FTC's considered policy objectives in this area.").
105Brief of the National Association of Manufacturers , supra note 96, at 1.
106129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
107See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of the
Chamber
of Commerce in Wyeth].
5
IM
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., in Support of
Petitioner, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of PLAC in Wyeth].
109See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation and American College of Emergency
Physicians as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249)
[hereinafter Brief of Washington Legal Foundation in Wyeth].
10
'
See Brief of the Generic Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of the Generic
Pharmaceutical Association]; Brief for PhRMA and BIO as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief for PhRMA and B10].
IIISee Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Wyeth, 129 S.
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In Wyeth, the third of the preemption cases, the Supreme Court
was presented with the issue of whether a plaintiff's state common
law failure-to-warn claim, for injuries resulting from administration
of the anti-nausea drug Phenergan, was impliedly preempted by FDA
labeling provisions.'1 The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, upheld
the Vermont Supreme Court's decision that federal law did not
preempt the plaintiff's claim.15
Similar to the briefing in Riegel and Altria, the Wyeth amici
asserted policy themes identical to those articulated in the earlier
preemption cases," 6 additionally focusing on constitutional and
federalism issues relating to the allocation of authority between
federal and state governments, as well as the appropriate deference to
7
be accorded to federal regulatory agency decision-making."1
Thus, in Wyeth, the Supremacy Clause was urged as the
"fountainhead of the doctrine of implied conflict preemption," a
doctrine that "serves a vital structural role in our Nation's government
by protecting federal law and programs against encroachment and
interference by subordinate governments."" 8 Again, the amici jointly
and severally argued that the Supremacy Clause--enforced through

Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief for the United States in Wyeth].
2
11 See Brief of John E. Calfee et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Wyeth, 129 S.
Ct. 1i87
(No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of John E. Calfee et al.].
13 See Brief of DRI-The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of DRI]. DRI-the Voice of
the Defense Bar identified itself and its members as having "extensive experience defending
litigation implicating the [FDA's] expert determinations regarding prescription drugs." Id. at 1.
14 See Rebecca Porter, Wyeth v. Levine Sets Up a Showdown in the Preemption Corral,
TRIAL, Oct. 2008, at 16.
II Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. atl1191, 1204.
116See, eg, Brief of Washington Legal Foundation in Wyeth, supra note 109, at I (urging
that "individual freedom, the American economy, and the public health and welfare suffer when
state law, including state tort law, imposes upon industry an unnecessary layer of regulation that
frustrates the objectives or operation of specific federal regulatory regimes, such as the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) at issue here.").
Other amici argued against the deleterious effects of lay juries second-guessing FDA
labeling decisions, see, e.g., Brief of the Generic Pharmaceutical Association, supra note 110, at
1, and the inability of pharmaceutical companies to comply with conflicting state and local
regulations. Id. at 2; see also Brief of DRI, supra note 113, at 1-2 (questioning the ability of lay
fact finders to comprehend complex scientific data underlying agency determinations in drug
labeling decisions).
In addition, the economists' amicus brief focused on an economice analysis of the
deleterious effects of state lawsuits; "State tort lawsuits exacerbate the problems of FDA's
overly cautious approach by imposing additional requirements on pharmaceutical companies to
add new warnings or contraindications." Brief of John E. Calfee et al., supra note 112, at 5.
17 See Sharkey, What Riegel Portends, supra note 6, at 424-25 (explaining deference to
agency decision-makting); Sharkey, Federalism in Action, supra note 6, at 1040-46. See
generally Brief for the United States, supra note IlIl (Court invited participation of the United
States).
118
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce in Wyeth, supra note 107, at 1-2.
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the implied preemption doctrine-"helps to create unified and
rational markets for nationally distributed goods and services by
ensuring that uniform federal regulation is not undermined or
subverted by state and local law, including state tort law as applied by
lay juries.""' Moreover, the PLAC advanced a Supremacy Clause
argument to lie to rest use of the presumption against federal
20
preemption in implied conflict cases such as Wyeth.'1
Several Wyeth amici positioned themselves as consumer
champions. Thus, these amici urged the Court to apply federal
preemption to protect consumer interests, suggesting that state failureto-warn lawsuits posed a threat to public health by encouraging
unduly risk-averse drug labeling, inducing manufacturers to withdraw
medicines from the market or not to introduce them at all, or
discouraging physicians from prescribing and using beneficial
medicines because of warnings about unsubstantiated risks.12' The
conservative economists writing on behalf of Wyeth further suggested
that additional labeling requirements, as a consequence of state
litigation, would "lead to a host of distortions in drug marketing and
availability that have adverse consequences for public health and
wellbeing." 122 Thus, "[p]reemption provides an important safeguard
against expected FDA Type HI errors by countering the exacerbating
123
impact of state tort lawsuits for failure to wam."
B. The Conservative Preemption Conundrum
The theme of this Article has been to tease out the strange
relationships that preemption doctrine has engendered among various
actors across the political spectrum. The previous section has
illustrated the muscular pro-federal regulatory position repeatedly
asserted by the major pro-business advocates before the Supreme
Court.
In addition to this incongruity, the preemption debate also has
highlighted how preemption doctrine has bridged an internal divide
among conservatives, uniting ideologically disparate wings of the
conservative movement. Thus, preemption doctrine has managed to
unite pragmatic free-market conservatives (who favor business
interests), ideological states-rights conservatives (who favor local
9

11

Id. at 2.

120Brief of PLAC in Wyeth, supra note 108, at 11-19. PLAC concludes that the Vermont

decision rejecting preemption was not only fundamentally unfair, but "impedes interstate
commerce and threatens the proper functioning of the federal regulatory system." Id. at 4.
121See Brief for PhRMA and BIO supra note 110, at 2.
122Brief of John E. Calfee et al., supra note 112, at 5.
23

1

Id. at 5-6.
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autonomy and no federal-interference with state power), and
libertarians (who favor individual rights, limited government, and free
speech protections).12
Ironic arguments abound. For example, in defense of federal
preemption, conservative lobbyists turn Supremacy Clause arguments
on their head. Rather than urging an interpretation of the Supremacy
Clause that protects and ensures states' rights, the pro-business
preemption advocates instead embrace a robust theory of the
Supremacy Clause to defend and protect federal regulatory programs
"4against encroachment
and
interference
by
subordinate
25
governments."1 Conservatives have thus positioned themselves, in
the preemption debate, as the guardians of the proper functioning of
the federal government and of the appropriate deference to be paid to
federal agency decision-makers.
Rather than urging a preemption doctrine that preserves and
protects local law and the use of local juries, the conservative
coalition instead decries the harmful influence of local justice. In the
preemption realm, pro-business interests find themselves defending
First Amendment speech protections against local constraints on
commercial speech. In defense of federal preemption, pro-business
interests have represented themselves as the true defenders,
advocates, and protectors of consumer interests, particularly in
advancing medical research and innovative product development.
And in the strange, inverted universe of preemption doctrine,
conservative pro-business interests make common cause with
libertarian defenders of individual rights.
III. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS II: THE CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL
PREEMPTION ALLIANCE
While the narrative of the conservative coalitions in support of
federal preemption is unusual, yet entertaining, the narrative of the
liberal-conservative alliance in support of federal preemption is
perhaps more confounding, if not more confusing. Nonetheless, as
will be discussed below, the Riegel decision instructs that it is
possible for liberal and conservative interests to align in support of
preemption doctrine. However, this is a fragile alignment, as the
Court's decisions in both Altiria and Wyeth demonstrate. In the end,
all three decisions make plausible political (if not jurisprudential)
sense.
SeRosen, Supreme Court Inc., supra note 10.
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce in Wyeth, supra note 107, at 1-2.
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A. Liberal Friends of the Court Against Preemption
As predictable as the conservatives are as repeat-player amici in
support of federal preemption, it should come as no surprise that an
opposite coalition of liberal causes has marshaled against express and
implied federal preemption of state law claims. This section surveys
the various groups that appeared before the court in Riegel, Altria,
and Wyeth, and the nature of the liberal arguments against federal
preemption.
Similar to the groups writing in support of preemption, the entities
urging the Court to reject federal preemption in Riegel,2 Altria,
and Wyeth 128 may be grouped into several categories: (1) public

justice advocacy groups 129 ; (2) states 130; (3) consumer rights.
coalitions 13 1; (4) industry specific associations132 ; (5) the United
126Six

amicus briefs were filed on behalf of the Petitioner Riegel.
'27Eight amicus briefs were filed on behalf of the Respondent Good.
128Twenty-two amicus briefs were filed on behalf of Respondent Levine.
129SeAmicus Curiae Brief of the American Association for Justice and Public Justice in
Support of Petitioners, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (No. 06-179)
[hereinafter Brief of the AMJ in Riegel; Brief for the American Association for Justice as
Amnicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249)
[hereinafter Brief of the AAJ in Wyeth]; Brief of the Constitutional Accountability Center as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief
of the Constitutional Accountability Center]; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Citizens Commission
on Human
Rights in Support of Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249).
30
1 See Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179) [hereinafter Brief for the States of New York et al.]; Brief
of Maine et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct.
538 (2008) (No. 07-562) [hereinafter Brief of Maine et al.]; Brief of Amici Curiae Vermont et
al. in Support of Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of
Vermont et al.]; Brief of the National Conference of State Legislatures as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249).
131See Brief of Consumers Union of United States, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179) [hereinafter Brief of Consumers Union in
Riegel; Brief of AARP et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999
(No. 06-179) [hereinafter Brief of AARP et al. in Riegel; Brief of the Public Health Advocacy
Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179)
[hereinafter Brief of the Public Health Advocacy Institute et al.]; Brief of Amici Curiae
Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition and Legal Resource Center for Tobacco Regulation,
Litigation & Advocacy in Support of Respondents, Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538 (No. 07-562)
[hereinafter Brief of Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition]; Brief for Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No.
06-1249); Brief of the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection
Laws, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Wyeth, 129 5. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249)
[hereinafter Brief for the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection
Laws, Inc.]; Brief for Amicus Curiae the National Coalition Against Censorship in Support of
Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief for the National Coalition
Against Censorship]; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Senior Citizens League in Support of
Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of the Senior Citizens
League].
132 See Brief of Amici Curiae Tobacco Control Legal Consortium et al. in Support of
Respondents, Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538 (No. 07-562) [hereinafter Brief of Tobacco Control Legal
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States government, agency officials, and Congressmen 13 3 ; and (6)
professors. 134 Although the amici advanced various nuanced statutory,
constitutional, textual, and jurisprudential arguments in opposition to
federal preemption (both express and implied), the amici also
articulated an array of fundamental policy reasons against the
application of federal preemption in these cases.
13
and Public
The American Association for Justice ("AAJ")
Justice 16set forth the broadest arguments for limiting preemption,

Consortium et al.]; Brief of American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538 (No. 07-562) [hereinafter Brief of American Medical
Association et al.].
The greatest number of industry and labor union-affiliated groups filed on behalf of Levine
in Wyeth. See Brief of the Texas Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of the Texas Medical
Association et al.]; Brief of the California Medical Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of the California Medical
Association]; Brief of Amnicus Curiae AARP et al. in Support of Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct.
1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of AARP et al. in Wyeth]; Brief of New England Journal
of Medicine Editors and Authors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct.
1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of New England Journal of Medicine]; Brief of Kim
Witezak et al. as Amnici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249)
[hereinafter Brief of Kim Witezak et al.]; Brief of DES Action as Arnicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of DES Action]; Brief of
Arnici Curiae Anju Budhwani, M.D., et al. in Support of Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187
(No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of Anjo Budhwani, M.D., et al.].
33
' See Brief of Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, supra note 14; Brief of Former
Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538 (No. 07-562) [hereinafter Brief of Former Commissioners of the FTC];
Brief for the United States as Amnicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538
(No. 07-562) [hereinafter Brief for the United States in Altria]; Brief of Amnici Curiae Members
of Congress in Support of Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief
of Members of Congress]; Brief of Amici Curiae Former FDA Commissioners Dr. Donald
Kennedy and Dr. David A. Kessler in Support of Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 061249) [hereinafter Brief of Former FDA Commissioners].
134See Brief of Amnicus Curiae Constitutional and Administrati ve Law Scholars in Support
of Respondents, Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538 (No. 07-562); Brief of Allan M. Brandt et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538 (No. 07-562); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Constitutional and Administrative Law Scholars in Support of Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct.
1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of Constitutional and Administrative Law Scholars in
Wyeth]; Brief of Torts Professors Mark P. Gergen and Michael D. Green as Amnici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of Torts
Professors]; Brief of Daniel Paul Carpenter et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of Daniel Paul Carpenter et al.]; Brief
of Amnici Curiae David B. Ross, M.D., Ph.D. and Stefan P. Kmuszewski, M.D. in Support of
Respondent, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of David B. Ross].
AAJ stated that it is a voluntary national bar association consisting of
135T
approximately 52,000 trial lawyers who chiefly represent individual plaintiffs in civil suits and
personal injury actions. "Throughout its 40-year history, the association has championed the
fundamental right of every American to legal recourse for redress of wrongful injury."~ Brief of
the AAJ in Riegel, supra note 129, at 1.
136
Public Justice stated that it was "a national public interest law firm dedicated to
pursuing justice for the victims of corporate and governmental abuses." Id.
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which the numerous amici appearing in these cases repeated. In
essence, these public interest lobbying groups framed the preemption
debate as embracing an access-to-justice and consumer protection
problem. In this view, tort law and the tort system serve two
fundamental purposes: to compensate injured persons harmed by
wrongful conduct, and to deter bad actors from future similar
conduct. To the extent that preemption doctrine was applied to
eliminate access to state courts and state causes of action, the
purposes of the tort system would not be served and innocent victims
of wrongdoing would go un-remediated. 137 In addition, the
application of federal preemption to displace state product liability
suits imperiled the safety and health of consumers. 3
The public interest law lobbyists sought to locate federal
regulatory power alongside state tort law remedies, arguing that
Congress never "intended to rely exclusively on FDA regulation to
ensure the safety of potentially dangerous medical devices" or
drugs.139 Thus, the liberal advocates neither whole-heartedly
embraced nor eschewed federal regulatory power. These advocates
instead recognized the concurrent roles of the federal government in
providing national regulatory standards to safeguard products on the
market, and of the state courts in compensating citizens for injuries.
In this view, "courts have traditionally viewed regulation and liability
as complementary approaches to product safety." 14 0 Moreover, some
amici challenged the presumption that regulatory agencies possess
4
singular expertise in their areas of regulatory control.'1 1
37

Id. at 1, 26-27.
e.g., Brief for the States of New York et al., supra note 130, at 1; see also Brief of
New England Journal of Medicine, supra note 132, at 5 ("Without the tort system, the FDA
would be stripped of an essential source of information that the agency has consistently relied
on when making its regulatory decisions, and the American public would be deprived of a vital
deterrent against pharmaceutical company misconduct."); Brief of Kim Witczak, et al., supra
note 132, at 3-4 (noting inability of F~DA to protect public health and the danger of eliminating
the valuable check of state tort litigation); Brief of DES Action, supra note 132, at 3-4 (same);
Brief of Former FDA Commissioners, supra note 133, at 2 (arguing that preemption "threatens
to undermine, not advance, the underlying goal of nation's drug safety laws, which is 'to protect
consumers from dangerous products"' (quoting United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696
(1948))).
13 Brief of the AAI in Riegel, supra note 129, at 4.
""4Id.; see also Brief of Torts Professors, supra note 134, at 4-17 (arguing that FDA
regulatory and state law tort systems are complementary).
141See, e.g., Brief of the Citizens Commission on Human Rights in Support of
Respondent, supra note 129, at I ("However, substantial public record information indicates
that this presumption of the FDA's singular expertise is neither accurate nor warranted. And,
upon this inaccurate presumption, the health and the lives of literally millions of persons hang in
the balance."); see also Brief of the Senior Citizens League, supra note 131, at 3 (questioning
FDA agency expertise as insufficient to protect consumers); Brief of AARP et al. in Wyeth,
supra note 132, at 2-3 (questioning FDA regulatory expertise); Brief of David B. Ross, supra
note 134, at 3-4 (commenting on deficiencies and abuses in FDA drug approval process).
1

138See,
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Thus, the amici urged that Congress enacted its regulatory statutes
to protect the public from unsafe medical devices and drugs, but did
not at the same time eliminate, or intend to eliminate, state-law
142
Several Congressmen joined as amici to
remedies for injunies.
clarify the intent of Congress in enacting the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (MDA) and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA). 41 1 "For good reasons Congress and, until recently, the FDA
viewed state tort liability as an important complement to federal
regulation in ensuring safe and effective drugs."'"4 The
complementary roles of federal regulation and state tort law
adjudication worked in tandem to ensure both ex ante review of
medical devices and drugs prior to market distribution, but also
permitted ex post adjudication in products liability suits based on real
individuals' actual experiences with medical devices and drugs under
45
real world conditions.1

In Altria, the states as amici centered their public policy arguments
on the state police powers in protecting the health and safety of its
citizens. As such, the states as amici, joined by various consumer
groups, 16 advanced strong Tenth Amendment states' rights
arguments against the preemption doctrine. The states forcefully
urged that federal and state governments had enjoyed longstanding

Consumer advocates were joined in the argument over agency competency by several
former Commissioners of the FTC, who advocated for complementary systems of regulation
and adjudication. See Brief of Former Commissioners of the FTC, supra note 133, at 3-4, 6. In
addition, the United States government also joined on behalf of Respondent in Altria opposing
application of preemption, based on misapprehension of how the FTC had received and
reviewed information from tobacco companies regarding tar and nicotine content. Brief for the
United States in Altria, supra note 133, at 15-16.
142E.g., Brief of the Senior Citizens League, supra note 13 1, at 3.
14 See, e.g., Brief of Members of Congress, supra note 133, at 3-4 (arguing that the intent
of Congress was to deliberately preserve state law damage claims); Brief of Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, supra note 14 (same).
'" Brief of the AMJ in Wyeth, supra note 129, at 2; see also Brief of Maine et al., supra
note 130, at 2 (commenting on the complementary roles of the FTC and State Attomneys General
in enforcing laws and regulations against deceptive trade practices); Brief of Consumers Union
in Riegel, supra note 13 1, at 3 (noting the comfortable fit of the FDA's regulatory scheme with
state-created common law aimed at protecting the health and safety of American consumers,
and providing compensation to injured parties); Brief of AARP et al. in Wyeth, supra note 132,
at 3 (commenting on the complementary partnership of tort system and federal regulatory roles).
11 See, e.g., Brief for the States of New York et al., supra note 130, at 1; see also Brief of
AARP et al. in Riegel, supra note 13 1, at 5-6 (noting that the pre-market approval system of the
FDA supplemented, but could not supplant the traditional functions of state tort liability, and
stating that "[tihe traditional state tort system provides manufacturers with safety incentives, the
public with information about defective devices, and victims with compensation for their
injuries"); Brief of Daniel Paul Carpenter et al., supra note 134, at 6 (noting that "[sitate-law
failure-to-wam litigation play[ed] an essential role in promoting drug safety").
'46See, e.g., Brief of the Senior Citizens League, supra note 13 1, at 2 (arguing on a Tenth
Amendment basis for opposition to preemption doctrine).
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cooperation in combating deceptive trade practices, which dual
authority would be undermined by application of implied preemption
under statutes such as the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act.147 Thus, federal preemption "would foreclose actions by
the Attorneys General and other state law enforcement agencies
against tobacco companies under state laws prohibiting deceptive or
misleading advertising-not only those related to 'light' cigarettes.
The result urged by Petitioners, therefore, would be a serious blow to
148
state law enforcement."
The National Conference of State Legislatures articulated the
strongest version of a states' rights theory in regard to authority for
49
state tort law, attacking the issue of preemption by preamble.1
Construing recent regulatory attempts to create preemption by
preamble, the state legislature lobbyists challenged this practice as an
assault on federalism and states' rights.150 In addition, the National
Conference decried preemption by preamble for its significant fiscal
implications for state governments.15
In the Wyeth implied preemption litigation, liberal public interest
lobbyists joined with the states' cause in highlighting that almost
every state and Congress had declined "to elevate compliance with
FDA requirements into a dispositive defense."15 2 The amici therefore
urged the Court not to create "a national FDA compliance affirmative
defense under the guise of implied conflict preemption." 5 More
broadly, the states as amici and various constitutional scholars urged
the Court to repudiate so-called "obstacle" or "frustration"
preemption-a variant of conflict preemption-as a potentially

147See, e.g., Brief of Maine et al., supra note 130, at 1.
49

See Brief of the National Conference of Slate Legislatures as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, supra note 130, at I ("State governments, and their legislatures, as independent
branches of co-equal States in our system of Federalism, are deeply involved in the creation of
State tort laws. As such, State Legislatures have been on the front line of the policy decisions
about 'Tort Reform."').
55
1 1d. (viewing preemption by preamble as "that attempt to seize, without the involvement
of Congress and the normal legislative process, and through circumvention of Executive Order
13132 'Federalism' (8/4/1999), entire areas of State authority").
151Id. at 2; see also Brief of Anju Budhwani, M.D., et al., supra note 132, at 1-2 (noting
the fiscal impact on labor unions' abilities to recoup expenses unreasonably associated with
unsafe medication). The Brief of Anju Budhwani, M.D., et al., supra note 132, included several
labor union arnici.
15 Brief of the AAJ in Wyeth, supra note 129, at 2 ("[Congress and the states] recognize
that such a defense would be difficult to apply, place excessive reliance on the FDA, undermine
incentives for drug companies to strengthen their warnings, and leave injured persons
remediless.").
153Id.
1
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boundless doctrine of implied preemption based on alleged frustration
154
of federal purpose.

Consumer protection advocates similarly advanced forceful states'
rights positions based on Tenth Amendment police powers reserved
to the states.155 In their briefing these advocates sought to ensure the
full enforceability of state consumer protection laws and to ensure
that state consumer protection laws were not "inappropriately limited
by overbroad interpretation and application of preemption provisions
in federal law." 156 The amici asserted their belief that the public could
not be adequately protected against dangerous medical devices and
other products without effective state law tort remedies. 157 In a similar
vein, consumer advocates also made common cause with physicians'
groups, who argued that preemption of pharmaceutical claims would
serve to obstruct physicians' access to complete and truthful
information about prescription drug safety, which would force
1 58
physicians to have to uncover such informnation of their own.
Regarding doctrinal arguments, liberal advocates who appeared as
amici in the case strongly urged application of the Court's historical
canon of construction, the presumption against preemption in both
express and implied preemption cases.15 9 Moreover, the liberal
advocates argued that the Supremacy Clause was not implicated in
154See, e.g., Brief of the Constitutional Accountability Center, supra note 129, at 2-3. The
Constitutional Accountability Center identified itself as a "think tank, law firm and action center
dedicated to fulfilling the progressive promise of our Constitution's text and history." Id. at 1. it
further stated that it assisted "[sitate and local officials in upholding valid and democratically
enacted measures and historic common law remedies." Id.; see also Brief of Vermont et al.,
supra note 130, at 3-4 ("Congress's authority ... gives it vast opportunities to preempt state
law, If the political process is to serve as a genuine check on that power, states must be give
notice when their authority is at risk. Implied frustration preemption undermines that check.").
'55 See, e.g., Brief of the Senior Citizens League, supra note 131, at 2 ("By its
misstatement of Congressional authority, Wyeth sidesteps the presumption against preemption
of the police powers reserved to the states, as secured by the Tenth Amendment.").
56
1 Brief of Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition, supra note 13 1, at 2; see also Brief of
American Medical Association et al., supra note 132, at 2 (urging that the litigation involved in
Altria was about the defendant's alleged fraudulent conduct, and not its failure-to-warn).
'57 See, e.g., Brief of the Public Health Advocacy Institute et al., supra note 13 1, at 2; see
also Brief for the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Laws,
it., supra note 131, at 2 ("The Center is concerned that an aggressive program of preemption
of state laws by federal regulatory agencies will result in inadequate protection of consumers
under state product liability and consumer protection laws."); Brief of Tobacco Control Legal
Consortium et al., supra note 132, at 4 (stating that preemption finding could seriously
undermine states' ability to enforce consumer protection and anti-fraud statutes concurrently
with FTC enforcement efforts).
58See, e.g., Brief of the California Medical Association, supra note 132, at 1-2; Brief of
the Texas Medical Association et al., supra note 132, at 2-4; 4f Brief for the National Coalition
Against Censorship, supra note 131, at 3 (arguing that Wyeth had a First Amendment right to
issue supplemental warnings and therefore no conflict preemption applied).
"I9See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional and Administrative Law Scholars in Wyeth, supra note
134, at 4-14.
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preemption cases permitting state court juries to award compensatory
damages. 160
B. Making Sense of Riegel, Altria and Wyeth
Earlier sections of this Article have illustrated how preemption
doctrine has united various conservative ideological strains in support
of robust federal preemption of state law claims, transforming
conservative ideologues into pseudo-federal regulatory enthusiasts. In
a similar fashion, preemption doctrine has aligned disparate and
sometimes seemingly inconsistent liberal causes in opposition to
preemption. It is of course logical that the States themselves would
advocate strong states' rights positions in the preemption debate.
However, in the cause of consumer protection, liberal activists have
been transformed into ardent states' rightists. Thus, liberal advocates
who might be expected to strongly support encompassing
federalization schemes have made common cause with states' rights
lobbyists.
Perhaps even stranger, an unusual coalition of conservative and
liberal Justices aligned last Term in the Court's decision in Riegel,
causing some commentators to speculate whether this unusual
coalition augured further restrictive preemption decisions in the
future.'16' This forecast turned out not to be true in the Court's
subsequent Altria and Wyeth decisions, where the Court rejected
preemption defenses in the implied preemption context.
Is it possible to reconcile the Court's confounding preemption
decisions in Riegel, Altria, and Wyeth? While constitutional and
administrative law scholars no doubt will devote much time to
parsing various statutory interpretations of the preemption language at
issue in each of these cases, it is possible to make some coherent
sense of this trilogy if viewed through purely political and ideological
lenses.
In Rie gel the Court, in an 8-1 decision, upheld express federal
preemption of state common law tort claims, holding the claims
preempted by the express language of the Medical Device
Amendments Act of 1976. 162 As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has noted,
the Rie gel litigation united both the liberal and conservative wings of
160Id.
161See Chemeninsky, supra note 11, at 64 ("Preemption cases create the opportunity for an
unusual coalition of the more liberal justices, like Justice Stephen Breyer, who favor more
expansive national power, and the conservative justices, like Scahia and Chief Justice John
Roberts, who are strongly pro-business. That is exactly what happened in Riegel, and that is
what will probably happen in future cases.").
62
1 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007-11 (2008).
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the Court, with Justice Ginsburg as the lone dissenting Justice. 163 The
Riegel opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, united not only the other
three conservative Justices,64 but also captured Justices Breyer,
Kennedy, Stevens, and Souter. 61 5 Justice Scalia's opinion in Riegel
relies heavily on the Court's previous preemption ruling in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.166 In Lohr, Justice Breyer had aligned with
four conservative Justices 17to
uphold federal preemption of
common-law causes of action for negligence and strict liability under
the MDA. More than a decade after Lohr, the other liberal-leaning
Justices (excepting Justice Ginsburg) now aligned with Justice Breyer
and the conservative wing of the Court in Rie gel.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion is entirely consistent with
conservative canons of judicial construction. Thus, in addition to
reliance on Lohr precedent, Justice Scalia grounds his preemption
conclusions on the express language of the MDA statute, which he
finds clear and unambiguous. 168 Futhermore, Justice Scalia eschews
recourse to congressional intent in construing the statutory language
and meaning concerning an additional "requirement." 169 Finally,
because Justice Scalia believes the MDA statute to speak clearly on
the issue of "requirements," he refuses to accord any deference to the
FDA's agency position, instead suggesting that no deference be paid
to the agency at all because of its prior inconsistent positions on

agency preemption.17

' 63 Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 64; see also Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1013-20 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
161Justices Alito, Roberts, and Thomas.
165See, e.g.,,Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 10 11- 13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1- 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
167Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and O'Connor.
68
1 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 at 1009. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, indicates that "I am
persuaded that its [the MDA's] text does preempt state law requirements that differ." See id. at
1011 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
169 1Id. at 1008 (majority opinion). Having indicated that he would not probe into
Congressional intent, Justice Scalia then proceeded to do precisely that:
It is not our job to speculate upon Congressional motives. If we were to do so,
however, the only indication available-the text of the statute-suggests that the
solicitude for those injured by FDA-approved devices, which the dissent finds
controlling, was overcome in Congress's estimation by solicitude for those who
would suffer without new medical devices if juries were allowed to apply the tort
law of 50 States to all innovations.
Id. at 1009.
In his separate concurrence, Justice Stevens disputes this policy argument. See id. at 1012
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring the judgment).
70
1 1Id.at 1009.

20091

2009]
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS87

873

In Altria,17 1 the Court split 5-4, with the liberal-leaning Justices
who opposed preemption of a state statutory fraud claim under the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act aligning against a
block of conservative Justices.172 The majority held that the plaintiff s
statutory claim under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act was
neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by the federal law.'
The Altria decision failed to unite liberal and conservative Justices
in favor of preemption (as in Rie gel). Perhaps the best political and
ideological explanation for this is that Altria essentially was a
replay-or a do-over-of the Court's earlier Cipollone litigation; that
is, cigarette litigation pursued under the exact same statutes as in
1 The chief difference between Cipollone and Altria is
Cipollone.74
that the former case posed the preemption issue of state common law
fraud claims, while Altria posed the preemption issue of state
statutory fraud claims. Given the array of opinions in Cipollone,
the fact that Altria revisited Cipollone perhaps doomed any
liberal-conservative coalition from the outset.
The Cipollone case famously did not produce a majority decision,
but instead produced three different opinions, none of which reflected
the views of a majority of the Court.175 In 1992, four Justices
(Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and Stevens) joined in a plurality
opinion setting forth a test to determine whether a particular common
law claim was preempted under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act.'176 Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter filed
separately; Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.
Based on the plurality test set forth in Cipollone, the Altria
majority concluded that the duty not to deceive codified in the Maine
statute was like the state common law rule at issue in Cipollone, and
that neither rule had anything to do with smoking and health. '17 The
majority's opinion was authored by Justice Stevens, who joined the
Rie gel majority and who would also write the majority opinion in
Wyeth, rejecting preemption. In Altria, Justice Stevens concluded that
just as the state common law fraud claim was not barred or preempted

17'Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
72Id. The five Justices supporting the majority opinion were Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissenting Justices included Justices Thomas, Roberts,
Scalia, and Alito.
1731Id.at 54 1.
174 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
17 5Alrria, 129 S. Ct. at 553 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the disparate opinions in
Cipollone).
17 6 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517-18.
17 7Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 545, 55 1.

874

874

WESTERN
~CASERESERVE LAW REVIEW

[o.5: 59:4
[Vol.

in Cipollone, the Maine statutory fraud claim could not be preempted

in Altria.17 1

The liberal-conservative split in Altria reflects the simmering
sixteen-year conservative discontent and dismay with the plurality
opinion in Cipollone.'"7 Both Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented in
Cipollone.'80 In Altria, Justice Thomas dissented against the
majority's reliance on the plurality opinion in Cipollone, instead
urging that the Court adopt an alternative analytical model suggested
by Justice Scalia in Cipollone.'8 1 In the intervening sixteen years
since Cipollone, the Court's conservative wing had added Justices
82
Alito and Roberts, who joined in Justice Thomas's dissent.1
If anything, the 5-4 split in Altria may represent a significant
fracture in the Cipollone line of cases under the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act. Four Justices of the Court now express
criticism of the Cipollone plurality opinion-especially directed at the
plurality's test for preemption. Moreover, the dissenting Justices
attempted to reposition the preemption debate by extensively
detailing the trend of moving away from a presumption favoring
preemption since Cipollone!8 3 In advancing this argument, the
dissenting Justices noted that Justice Stevens failed to invoke the
presumption in his majority opinion in Altria, and that the Court had
eschewed reliance on the presumption in Riegel.
The Wyeth decision, a 6-3 split, further solidified the Court's
liberal coalition in opposition to implied preemption,184 this time
joined in the judgment by Justice Thomas (a conservative strange
bedfellow). Relying in part on the presumption against prepio,8
the Court rejected Wyeth's "frustration of purpose" argument.186 And,
in a scathing criticism of the agency's failure to give notice, the
78

Id. at 546,
at 552-53 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the problems in interpreting and
applying the plurality opinion test in Cipollone).
80
1 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 544-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181
Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 551-63 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In response, Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority noted that "Justice Scalia's approach was rejected by seven Members of
the Court, and in the almost 17 years since Cipollone was decided Congress has done nothing to
indicate its approval of that approach. Moreover, Justice Thomas fails to explain why Congress
would have intended the result that Justice Scalia's approach would produce-namely,
permitting cigarette manufacturers to engage in fraudulent advertising. As a majority of the
Court concluded in Cipollone, nothing in the Labeling Act's language or purpose supports that
result." Id. at 545 n.7 (majority opinion).
82Id. at 551-63 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1

7

1 91d.

83

1

Id. at 555-5 8.

184Wyeth

v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). Justice Stevens wrote for the majority and was
joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justices Breyer and Thomas wrote
concurring opinions. Justices Alito, Roberts, and Scalia filed an opinion in dissent.
1851d. at 1195 n.3.
196!d. at 1199-1204.
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majority seized an opportunity to challenge the rulemaking in which
the preemption preamble was included and declined to accord any
deference to the FDA's 2006 preamble providing for state law
preemption.' 87 Instead, the Court relied on its understanding of
congressional purposes in enacting the FDA, as well as the prior FDA
position,188 and endorsed the view that FDA oversight and state tort
89
law remedies worked as complementary forms of drug regulation.'
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment because he found that
Wyeth, consistent with FDA regulations, could have supplemented its
label warnings, and, therefore, the Vermont court's judgment did not
conflict with federal law.' 90
Although united with the majority's conclusions in Wyeth, Justice
Breyer, writing in concurrence, left open the possibility that in future
cases he could uphold preemption based on other statutory language
or agency determinations. Thus, Justice Breyer reaffirmed his
position in Lohr that preemption might be appropriate in certain cases
where the FDA might seek to determnine whether state tort law acted
as a help or hindrance to achieving safe drug-related care.1'9 "It [the
FDA] may seek to embody those determinations in lawful specific
regulations describing, for example, when labeling requirements serve
192
as a ceiling as well as a floor."
Similarly, although concurring in the Court's judgment, Justice
Thomas sought to distance himself from the Court's sweeping
pronouncements in Wyeth. Consistent with his conservative ideology
and jurisprudence, Justice Thomas wrote separately because he could
not join the majority's "implicit endorsement of far-reaching implied
pre-emption doctrines." 19 3 In particular, Justice Thomas indicated that
he had become increasingly skeptical of the Court's "purposes and
objectives" preemption jurisprudence:
Under this approach, the Court routinely invalidates state
laws based on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy
objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of
congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text
of federal law. Because implied pre-emption doctrines that

87

1

8

Id. at 1201.
at 1201-03.

1 8Id.
89

Id. at 1203.
at 1204-05 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
191Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring).
1

19I.

92Id
93

1

Id. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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wander far from the statutory text are inconsistent with the
94
Constitution, I concur only in the judgment.'
Finally, dissenting Justices Alito, Roberts, and Scalia grounded
their objections to the majority's decision in a constitutional
Supremacy Clause argument: "But turning a common-law tort suit
into a 'frontal assault' on the FDA's regulatory regime for drug
labeling upsets the well-settled meaning of the Supremacy Clause and
our conflict pre-emption jurisprudence."195 The dissenters again
sought to bring the Wyeth litigation within the ambit of Rie gel,
suggesting that state juries were ill-equipped to perform the FDA's
96
cost-benefit balancing function in drug labeling.'
When viewed together, the Court's decisions in Riegel, Altria, and
Wyeth make rough political and ideological sense. The Court was able
to unite eight Justices in Rie gel, when faced with an express statutory
preemption provision. In Riegel, true to ideology, the conservative
Justices hewed to a jurisprudence of strict statutory construction
unaided by resort to legislative intent. The Altria litigation revealed
the Court's fault lines with regard to the peculiar preemption niche
occupied by Cipollone; conservative antipathy to the plurality's
Cipollone test for the preemptive effect of a state claim may now be
endangered by an increasingly fragile majority. Finally, Wyeth also
evidences a fragile majority, with Justice Breyer signaling adherence
to his position in the Lohr decision, and Justice Thomas at the ready
to return to the conservative preemption camp. It is sobering for
preemption opponents to realize that these two Justices would have
altered the result in Wyeth, a realization that ought to give pause to
commentators who might believe that Altria and Wyeth signify an end
to unfavorable preemption decisions.
IV. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS III: THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR AND THE
PREEMPTION SCHISM

The third strange bedfellow in the preemption debate is
represented by advocates for the plaintiffs' class action bar. To date,
the views of the class action bar on preemption have played virtually
no discernible role in preemption litigation, and none of the usual
class action advocates have appeared as amici in the leading
preemption cases. However, the class action bar's idiosyncratic
94

1

Id.

1951d.

at 1218 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for the United States in Wyeth, supra note

I111, at 21).
1961d.

at 1229.
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perspective on preemption jurisprudence is worthy of momentary
pause not for its effects on preemption litigation, but for its attempt to
hijack preemption jurisprudence for another purpose altogether.
Because the plaintiffs' class action preemption argument is itself
politically motivated, and because it is in conflict with the preemption
position of individual tort plaintiffs, the thesis concerning the
federalization of preemption law is explored below.
A. The Backdoor FederalizationArgument and Preemption
The class action plaintiffs' bar's views on preemption doctrine find
expression in a 2006 law review article by Professors Samuel
Issacharoff' 97 and Catherine M. Sharkey, entitled Backdoor
Federalization.19 8 In their article, Professors Issacharoff and Sharkey
posit that the Supreme Court's and lower appellate courts' robust
enforcement of federal preemption is one skein of jurisprudential
threads resulting in a tapestry of the federalization of law more
globally. The Professors' thesis is normative: "Our main argument is
that the U.S. Supreme Court has, in preemption and forum allocation
cases, attempted to capture the considerable benefits that flow from
national uniformity and to protect an increasingly unified national
(and international) commercial market from the imposition of
externalities by unfriendly state legislation."'9
As such, the Professors position themselves squarely with the
pro-federal regulatory proponents (the conservative wing of the
preemption debates), and in opposition to their natural allies (the
plaintiff's traditional tort bar). Professors Issacharoff and Sharkey
base their "backdoor federalization" thesis on four elaborate pillars.
First, the Professors argue that federal courts in recent years have
enhanced or expanded the application of federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to adjudicate state-based claims, in
derogation of diversity lawsuits.2 00 Second, the Professors argue the
saliency of Swift v. Tyson201 to support the position that the business
97Professor Issacharoff is the Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law at New York
University School of Law. During the 1990s and throughout the twenty-first century, Professor
Issacharoff has served as plaintiffs' class counsel and testifying expert witness on behalf of
plaintiffs' class actions. He has been a leading proponent of various choice-of-law theories that
courts may apply unitary law in nationwide class actions. Among the theories Professor
Issacharoff has endorsed, in support of class certification in multistate actions, is that the court
may apply (1) one state's law (usually the state of the defendant's incorporation), (2) multiple
states' laws grouped by similarity, or (3) some version of federal common law, based on the
theory that all states' laws are virtually identical.
198
Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 6..
1
991d.
20

at 1353-54.
1M.at 1409-14.
20141 U.S. (16 Pet.) I1(1842).
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of the Supreme Court historically was to address "national market
cases." 20 2 Third, the Professors point to a federalization of punitive
damage law,20 exemplified by the Supreme Court's recent decisions
in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore2 04~ and State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.205 Finally, the Professors
suggest that Congress's enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 (CAFA) 206 manifested a congressional intent to federalize tort
law.20
Having cobbled together these exemplars of the increasing trend
towards federalization of law-particularly what Professor
Issacharoff designates as "national market cases"-the authors add to
this analysis the Court's preemption decisions as additional evidence
of congressional and judicial intent to federalize tort, product
liability, and consumer protection law.20
The problem with the Issacharoff-Sharkey thesis is that it is wrong
as a matter of legislative history, judicial interpretation, and empirical
evidence. First, there is scant support for the suggestion that federal
question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 has expanded to
embrace state tort and consumer protection litigation. The Professors
base their theory largely on one anomalous case-Grable & Sons
Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing200-in
which the Supreme Court determined that federal question
jurisdiction for a state-based tax issue was permissible under the
so-called "ingredient test," where the resolution of the underlying
issue turned on a question of federal tax law of general applicability.
However, as the professors acknowledge only in a footnote, the
Supreme Court in the very next Term limited its holding in Grable to
a '''special and small category' of cases involving 'a nearly ''pure
issue of law," one "that could be settled once and for all and therefore

would govern numerous tax sale cases ....1
While the Grable decision is interesting for its momentary
resuscitation of the Holmesian ingredient theory of federal question
jurisdiction, Grable is nonetheless a judicial outlier. It can by no
means support the sweeping contention that federal courts have
2

02Issacharoff
203

& Sharkey, supra note 6, at 1399-1410.

Id. at 1420-28.

204517 U.S. 559 (1996).
20- 538

U.S. 408 (2003).
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2
07Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 6, at 14 15-20.
20
81d. at 1365-98.
200545 U.S. 308 (2005).
210
1ssacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 6, at 1414 n.245 (quoting Empire HealthChoice
Assurance, Inc v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699, 700 (2006).
206
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expanded federal question jurisdiction to entertain more state-based
tort, product liability, and consumer claims. There is virtually no
empirical evidence to support this claim.
Second, while it is interesting to investigate the back story of Swift
v. Tyson to demonstrate that the business of the Supreme Court
historically has been business and commercial cases, this history
proves too much (or perhaps too little). While it may (or may not)
capture the nineteenth century Supreme Court docket, this is
historical exegesis in search of evidence. Moreover, this analysis
completely ignores the second half of the twentieth century, when the
business of the Supreme Court turned primarily to protecting
individual civil rights and liberties. It takes a high degree of
interpretive license to attempt to shoehorn twentieth-century civil
liberties litigation into the historical mold of "national market cases."
Finally, it is nothing short of scholarly chutzpah to argue the primacy
of Swift, when its precedent has been so thoroughly and repeatedly
211
repudiated for over seventy years.
Third, it is a strange interpretation to suggest that the Supreme
Court's recent punitive damages case line extending through
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore and State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell demonstrates a trend towards
federalization. Rather, the Court's punitive damages decisions in
these cases reflect a conservative ideology that would enforce state
limitations on punitive damages awards by curbing the types of
permissible jury instructions or limiting punitive damages to
multipliers of compensatory damages. If anything, these punitive
damages decisions have consistently favored corporate defendants
appearing in state court litigation, while upholding the province of
state juries to make such determinations.
Finally, it is simply incorrect to suggest that Congress, in enacting
CAFA, intended to federalize class action law. Like preemption
doctrine itself, CAFA had its philosophical roots in the Republican
Contract with America and the conservative civil justice reform
movement of the 1980s and 1990s. Reform of class action litigation
has long been a platform of conservative advocates. CAFA was first
proposed in 1998 under the Clinton administration, but it was not
enacted into law until the second Bush administration in 2005.
The express purpose of CAFA was to deal with the problem of
212
The centerpiece of the
abusive class litigation in state courts.
211See

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4-5 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5-6; see
also Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Manageable Nationwide Class: A Choice-of-Law Legacy of
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 74 UMKC L. REV. 543, 548 (2006) (commenting on the
212
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CAFA statutory scheme is the provision for removal of state class
action litigation into federal court.2 1 Conservative advocates and
business interests lobbied for CAFA' s passage in the belief that
federal courts, with more restrictive class certification jurisprudence,
would curb the volume of alleged frivolous state court class litigation.
It was never the express or implied intent of Congress to either
federalize class action law or to federalize the substantive law that
applies to class actions.2 t
B. Making Sense of the Plaintiffs' Class Action Positionon
Preemption
Why, then, would academics aligned with the plaintiffs' bar urge
an interpretation of preemption doctrine that characterizes emerging
decisions as backdoor federalization? One answer is grounded in the
politics of post-CAFA aggregate class action litigation and
settlements. With the passage of CAFA, plaintiffs' class action
attorneys essentially have been forced, for the most part, out of
favorable state forums and into the federal class action arena. In
federal court, the major impediment to class certification of
nationwide class actions has been the choice-of-law issue, which
essentially frustrates the ability of federal courts to certify such cases.
Consequently, the plaintiffs' class action bar and its academic
advocates have advocated the theory that CAFA intended to
federalize both procedural and substantive law. If the plaintiffs' class
action bar can prevail on the theory of federalized substantive law as
applied to national class actions-a return to Swift v. Tyson-then
class action attorneys may make inroads on the ability to certify such
classes, or to coerce settlements from defendants. In this quest, the
ability to convince federal courts that recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence manifests a trend in favor of federalization will
substantially advance class action plaintiffs' interests. To this end, the
Court's preemption jurisprudence has been impressed into service as
an additional exhibit in support of the federalization thesis.

purposes of CAFA to remove abusive state class actions into federal court).
213
See 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006).
214
See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity
and Hypocrisy, 106 cOLUM. L. REv. 1924, 1938-44 (2006) (rejecting the argument that courts
can and should use CAFA as authorization to fashion federal choice of law rules to govern class
actions, directly refuting Professor Issacharoff s claims to that effect); Stephen B. Burbank, The
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L.
REv. 1439, 1529 (2008) (arguing that CAFA does not purport to change Erie jurisprudence).
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Just as the four pillars articulated by Professors Issacharoff and
Sharkey are weak support for the edifice of backdoor federalization,
so too is the argument for preemption jurisprudence. If nothing else,
this Term's decisions in Altria and Wyeth refute the thesis that the
Court consistently favors federal preemption of state law claims.
Instead, similar to the jurisprudence relating to federal court
jurisdiction, choice-of-law issues, punitive damages theory, and
CAFA, the evidence suggests an alternative narrative: that
conservative deference to state courts and local law is still very much
alive and robust.
CONCLUSION

The Court's decisions in Riegel, Altria, and Wyeth will no doubt
inspire a wealth of close jurisprudential analysis, as preemption
scholars seek to illuminate the Court's shifting positions on express
and implied preemption, "frustration" preemption, congressional
"4purposes," the presumption favoring preemption, and appropriate
deference to agency actions, among many other textual and doctrinal
issues.
This Article has merely attempted to divine how the preemption
cases have engendered some unusual political alignments,
confounding ordinary appreciation. The cases suggest that
conservative advocates have remained the closest to their ideological
roots, notwithstanding their purported support for the federal
administrative and regulatory state. The Court's conservative
coalition may be counted upon to adhere to strict statutory
construction in express preemption cases and to repudiate recourse to
legislative history as an interpretive tool; to challenge the doctrinal
incoherence of the Cipollone plurality opinion in the hopes of
repudiating it; and to eschew the power of state juries to second-guess
federal regulatory decisions in implied preemption cases. In the end,
the conservative position on preemption is entirely consistent with the
goals of the civil justice reform movement, a position that
consistently seeks to limit access to justice, to curb frivolous
litigation, and to contain state tort litigation.
Liberal advocates in the preemption debate present a more
complicated picture. At one and the same time, liberal lobbyists argue
in favor of federal regulatory authority, in favor of state juries, in
favor of states' Tenth Amendment police powers, and in favor of
nuanced interpretations concerning when preemption may or may not
be appropriate. These seeming contradictions are rationalized by the
theory that consumer protection may be achieved by complementary

882

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:4

systems of regulation, at least in some cases. The liberal dilemma,
at the current moment, seems concentrated in the conflicted
jurisprudence of Justice Breyer, who would have it all ways.
Finally, the somewhat attenuated theory posited by class action
advocates-that preemption doctrine is another strong example of a
trend towards backdoor federalization-places class action attorneys
in opposition to individual tort lawyers who oppose application of
federal preemption to foreclose state tort litigation. As indicated
above, this federalization "trend" argument has been rendered
additionally dubious by the Court's decisions in Altria and Wyeth.

